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INTRODUCTION
In recent years, several litigation investment companies have
appeared.' Typically, these companies acquire the rights to patent-
infringement suits from private inventors who cannot finance their
own lawsuits.' These investment companies may then syndicate the
lawsuits, that is, sell shares in the lawsuits to raise money to finance
the litigation.' The potential returns, although highly speculative,
are enormous.4 The syndication market is relatively new, but one
company is considering plans to acquire a portfolio of lawsuits and
sell shares in the fund to investors.5
Buying lawsuits is not a new concept. The ancient common law
doctrine of champerty made illegal all agreements to share in the
proceeds of another's lawsuit.6 At common law, speculating in
litigation was against public policy.7 Although much of the
common law on champerty has eroded to near obsolescence,' the
core of the doctrine-the public policy against profiteering and
speculating in litigation-still survives in most states.
9
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I See Linda Himelstein, Investors Wanted-For Lawsuits, Bus. WK., Nov. 15, 1993, at
78, 78; see also Reynolds Holding, Investing in Other People's Lawsuits, S.F. CHRON.,Jan.
12, 1996, at B1 (discussing Judgment Purchase, a company that buys shares in
judgments on appeal).
2 See Himelstein, supra note 1, at 78.
'See Cynthia L. Cooper, Champerty, Anyone?, CAL. LAw.,Jan. 1991, at 19, 19.
4 For example, in 1990, investors who financed a lawsuit won a verdict worth an
estimated $63 million. See Leslie Spencer, Some Call It Champerty, FORBES, Apr. 30,
1990, at 72, 72.
5 See Telephone Interview with Roger Dillan, President, WBX Partners (Feb. 1994).
6 See 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty &Maintenance § 7 (1964).
7 See 14 C.J.S. Champerty &Maintenance § 2 (1991).
8 See 14 AM.JuR. 2D Champerty &Maintenance § 1 (1964) ("In none of the states
are the doctrines or laws of champerty and maintenance preserved in their original
rigor. In many states they are declared to be obsolete and to have no existence at
all.").
' For a discussion of the modern status of champerty laws, see infra part III.B.
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Despite these laws against investing in litigation, modern lawsuit
investors have achieved some success in fending off legal challenges
to their syndicated lawsuits. In 1978, in the first modern syndicated
lawsuit, Thee v. Parker Bros.,"0 Carl E. Person, the plaintiffs attor-
ney, was able to "cut through the... maze"1' of legal technicalities
and obtain clearance from the Securities and Exchange Commission,
the New York Bureau of Securities, the American Bar Association,
and a federal court to offer shares in an antitrust suit against a
gamemaker who copied the plaintiffs game.1 2  Although the
plaintiff ultimately prevailed, the offering of shares in the lawsuit
failed due to poor investor interest."3 More than a decade later,
in 1991, two California investors fended off a challenge to the
legality of one of the most successful lawsuit syndications ever. 4
One company that invests in disputed intellectual property rights is
publicly traded. 5 However, it has encountered judicial hostility to
its business.
16
For a discussion of the policy against speculation in litigation, see infra part IV.D.1.
10 [1978-1981 Transfer Binder] Copyright L. Dec. (CCH) 25,017 (E.D.N.Y. Mar.
9, 1978).
" INTELLECTUAL PROPERTIES, INC., OFFERING CIRCULAR UNDER SEC RULE 154A
EXEMPTION 8 (1993) (available on the Internet (http://www.lawmall.com))
[hereinafter OFFERING CIRCULAR].
12 See id.; see also A Scheme to Sell Pieces of an Action, Bus. WK., May 24, 1976, at 35,
35-36 (discussing a New York lawyer's scheme to finance a lawsuit by selling 100,000
shares through an unregistered stock offering).
13 See Daniel C. Cox, Comment, Lawsuit Syndication: An Investment Opportunity in
Legal Grievances, 35 ST. LOUIS U. LJ. 153, 154-56 & nn.9-25 (1990) (discussing the
Thee case); see also OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 11, at 8 ("Because the Thee
offering was self-underwritten and neither Thee nor Person was in the business of
selling stock of any kind, the offering was discontinued for lack of any substantial
dollar amount of subscriptions.").
14 See Killian v. Millard, 228 Cal. App. 3d 1601, 1607 (Ct. App. 1991); Spencer,
supra note 4, at 72.
15 Refac Technology is engaged in international licensing and technology transfer
and trades publicly on the American Stock Exchange. See CEO Interview: Refac
Technology Development Corporation, WALL ST. TRANSCRIPT, Dec. 26, 1994, at *1,
available in Westlaw, Allnws Database. According to the company's CEO,
"[o]ccasionally, we confront situations where the patent rights of a client seem to be
infringed by third parties-and.., we may consider it necessary to litigate." Id. at *2.
16 See Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Hitachi, Ltd., 921 F.2d 1247, 1256-57 (Fed. Cir. 1990)
(affirming the district court's dismissal of a patent infringement suit, imposing
sanctions in excess of $200,000 for filing a frivolous appeal, reversing the lower
court's denial of Rule 11 sanctions, and remanding for further Rule 11 sanction
proceedings); Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Hitachi Ltd., 141 F.R.D. 281, 284 (C.D. Cal. 1991)
(awarding, on remand, close to $1.5 million in Rule 11 sanctions against Refac); Refac
Int'l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 131 F.R.D. 56, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (invalidating Refac's
purchase of patent infringement claims on the ground that the agreement was
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This Comment discusses the legal impediments to investing in
litigation and focuses on reaching concrete and specific conclusions
on the viability of and limitations on such investment. To facilitate
a more realistic assessment of the practical impact of these legal
impediments to litigation investment, the legal analysis is con-
ducted through a hypothetical litigation investment company,
"Champerco."
Part I uses a law and economics approach to explore the basic
premise underlying this Comment: There is a market for investor-
financed litigation. Part I demonstrates some of the benefits of
investor-financed lawsuits and, in the process, refutes some popular
objections to the practice. Part II sets forth a blueprint for a
company designed to meet the market demand for investor-financed
litigation envisioned in Part I. Part III discusses the history,
policies, and modern status of the law on champerty. Part IV
examines the practicability of contracting around champerty laws in
light of modern conflicts law and concludes that three steps can be
taken to create enforceable champertous agreements.
I. THE MARKET FOR LITIGATION FINANCING
Litigation is an investment process. 7 Traditionally, plaintiffs
pay their litigation expenses as they arise during the progression of
their lawsuits. These payments are "investments" by plaintiffs."
Often, however, plaintiffs will decide not to invest in their lawsuits.
Litigation can drag on for years and the costs can add up tremen-
dously19 without any guarantee of a recovery. With prospects of
any recovery uncertain and, in any event, months or years away,
many plaintiffs may find it too risky to "invest." Even a plaintiff
willing to make the risky investment in his lawsuit may not have the
"nothing but a hunting license"); Refac Int'l, Inc. v. IBM Corp., 710 F. Supp. 569,572
& n.1 (D.N.J. 1989) (finding Refac's patent infringement suit frivolous and ordering
Refac to pay defendants' attorneys fees, estimated to be $2.5 million).
17See David M. Trubek et al., The Costs of Ordinary Litigation, 31 UCLA L. REV. 72,
76-77 (1983) (conceptualizing litigation as "the investment of scarce resources to
achieve a future result").
Is See id.
19 See 1994 FEDERAL COURT MANAGEMENT STATISTICS 167 (reporting that in 1994
the median duration, from filing to trial, of all federal district court civil cases was 18
months, and that 6.2% of all cases on the courts' dockets were more than three years
old); A. Leo Levin & Denise D. Colliers, Containing the Cost of Litigation, 37 RUTGERS
L. REV. 219, 227-29 (1985) (discussing the continuing increases in the cost of civil
litigation).
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economic means to do so. These plaintiffs may abandon their
claims unless there are alternative, less costly or less risky, methods
of financing their lawsuits.
While borrowing against a claim is theoretically possible, in
reality, banks and other lending institutions are unlikely to make
such risky loans.2' A better alternative might be to sell the lawsuit.
Rather than abandoning a lawsuit because it is an unaffordable or
risky "investment," a plaintiff can sell the lawsuit to an investor who
believes that the lawsuit is a good investment. Alternatively, a
plaintiff can sell shares in his lawsuit to raise money to finance the
suit. This practice is actually widespread. 2' Theoretically, in
contingent fee agreements, plaintiffs sell their lawsuits to entrepre-
neurial lawyers in exchange for a share of the profits. Viewed
another way, contingent fee lawyers buy shares in lawsuits and pay
with legal services instead of cash. 2
Underlying the concept of buying and selling lawsuits is the
assumption that a lawsuit might be worth more to one party (that
is, the investor) than to another (that is, the plaintiff). Using law
and economics analysis, this Part explores the factors that make
lawsuits more valuable to one person than another. This analysis
will reveal the efficiency and benefits of the free trade of claims.
23
A. Risk-Bearing and the Willingness to Litigate Claims
The most significant factor that makes a claim more valuable to
one party than another is the difference in the parties' relative risk-
bearing abilities. There are several factors that affect a party's risk-
bearing ability. One factor is a party's wealth. To illustrate the
effect of a party's wealth on its risk-bearing ability and, thus, on the
20 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 567 (4th ed. 1992). The
highly speculative proceeds of litigation are too risky for traditional lenders, many of
whom are government regulated, to lend against, and the appropriate interest rates
for loans with this risk grade may run afoul of usury laws. Also, the costs to lending
institutions of valuing the borrower's claim may be prohibitively expensive. Further-
more, certain types of claims, such as tort claims, are generally unassignable. See id.
21 See Roy D. Simon, Jr., Lawsuit Syndication: Buying Stock in justice, 69 Bus. &
Soc'Y REV. 10, 13 (1989) (arguing that contingent fee arrangements, factoring, and
public interest litigation are existing examples of lawsuit syndication).
2 See generally POSNER, supra note 20, at 567 (describing the contingent fee
agreement as a contract where "[t]he lawyer lends his services against a share of the
claim").
2s Id. at 567-69.
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value it places on a claim, consider the following two hypothetical
scenarios.
24
First, suppose someone holds the winning ticket to a $150,000
lottery, but the lottery company refuses to honor the ticket because
it claims that the ticket is a forgery. The ticket holder consults with
a lawyer, who informs her that it will cost $25,000 to sue the lottery
company and that she will have a 50% chance of recovering the
$150,000 jackpot. The ticket holder, hereinafter the "blue collar
plaintiff," has savings totalling only $25,000. After weighing the
50% chance of recovering $125,000 (after costs) against the 50%
chance of losing $25,000, her entire life savings, she decides that a
$25,000 loss would be too devastating to her financial position, and
she simply "cannot afford" to take that risk. She feels that she has
worked too hard to save the $25,000 to just "gamble" it away on a
lawsuit. She, therefore, abandons her claim.
Second, suppose the same facts as the first scenario, except that
the ticket holder, hereinafter the "white collar plaintiff," is a wealthy
investor. To the white collar plaintiff, the lawsuit is an excellent
investment opportunity. With an average recovery of $75,000 and
a cost of only $25,000, he can earn a hefty 200% return by "invest-
ing" in the lawsuit. He can afford the risk of a $25,000 loss, as it
would only marginally affect his total wealth. He, therefore, hires
a lawyer and sues the lottery company.
As these two scenarios illustrate, the same claim that one party
abandons without any recovery is pursued by another party for an
average recovery of $50,000 (after litigation costs). The difference
between the two plaintiffs is their risk-bearing abilities. The white
collar plaintiff is a better risk bearer simply because the claim
constitutes a much smaller percentage of his wealth.2" The risk is
diversified with the rest of his wealth. This difference in risk-
bearing abilities creates a difference in valuation between the blue
24 These hypotheticals are variations on a simpler hypothetical posed by Richard
Posner. See id. at 567 (exploring a hypothetical in which a plaintiff has a claim of
$100,000 with a 50% probability of success).
' The theory of risk averseness is a corollary of the theory of the diminishing
marginal utility of money. See ROBERT COOTER & THOMAS ULEN, LAW AND
ECONOMICS 58 (1988). The rate of decrease in the marginal utility of money
decreases with increases in wealth. Therefore, a party's degree of risk averseness
decreases with increases in wealth. See id. In simple terms, $25,000 is a much smaller
percentage of the white collar plaintiff's wealth than it is of the blue collar plaintiff's
wealth.
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collar plaintiff, for whom the claim is worth nothing, and the white
collar plaintiff, for whom the claim is worth close to $50,000.26
The different values the two plaintiffs place upon the claim
creates an opportunity for a mutually beneficial trade. Rather than
abandoning her claim, the blue collar plaintiff can sell her claim to
the white collar plaintiff. Suppose, for example, the blue collar
plaintiff sells the lottery ticket for $10,000 to the white collar
plaintiff. To the white collar plaintiff, a $40,000 average return on
a $35,000 investment far exceeds the market-rate of return.7 To
the blue collar plaintiff, a guaranteed $10,000 gain is preferable to
abandoning her lawsuit and recovering nothing. The sale of the
lottery ticket will, therefore, benefit both parties. The only loser in
this sale is the lottery company, which might now be forced to
honor the lottery ticket. 28 These two hypotheticals illustrate the
potential gains from the free trade of claims from poor risk-bearing
parties to better risk-bearing parties. These potential gains from
trade create a market for litigation. 9  As with the free trade of
other property, the gains are efficient and beneficial.3"
Another factor that affects a party's risk-bearing ability is the
party's risk diversification. A party owning many risky claims is
better able to bear the risk of any particular claim and will,
therefore, value the claim higher than another nondiversified
" The claim is worth nothing to the blue collar plaintiffbecause she will abandon
the claim. The white collar plaintiff will pursue the claim with a 50% chance of
winning $150,000, for an average recovery of $75,000. Because it will cost him
$25,000 in litigation costs to litigate the claim, his average return is $50,000. This
amount must be risk-discounted because even the white collar plaintiff would prefer
a guaranteed $50,000 to the lottery ticket.
27 With a 50% chance of recovering $150,000, the average expected recovery is
$75,000. The lawsuit costs $35,000, $10,000 to buy it and $25,000 to litigate it,
making the average expected profit $40,000, an expected return of 114%.
21 One of the most popular objections to the sale of lawsuits is that it foments
litigation. For a discussion of this objection, see infra part IV.D.2. See also Simon,
supra note 21, at 11-12 (discussing the argument that "syndication stirs up [frivolous]
litigation"). This morally infused hypothetical exposes a fundamental flaw in this
objection. When a lottery company takes advantage of the helplessness of a poor
lottery winner, no one would argue that a lawsuit to vindicate her rights should be
discouraged. Meritorious litigation should not be discouraged, and as demonstrated
here, the fact that the blue collar plaintiff would not have brought this lawsuit does
not reflect negatively on the merits of the claim. It is simply a consequence of the
blue collar plaintiff's poor risk-bearing ability.
2 See POSNER, supra note 20, at 10 ("[R]esources tend to gravitate toward their
most valuable uses if voluntary exchange-a market-is permitted.").
" See generally id. at 12-16 (discussing thedesirability of an economically efficient
exchange).
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party.3' Returning again to the lottery ticket scenario, suppose
that several other lottery companies, on rumors of rampant lottery
ticket counterfeiting, have all refused to honor .winning lottery
tickets. The white collar plaintiff, pleased with his 114% expected
return on the disputed winning lottery ticket he purchased, seeks
out more blue collar plaintiffs who "cannot afford" to litigate their
claims and purchases fifty more disputed winning lottery tickets for
$10,000 each. Assuming that the outcome of each lottery ticket
lawsuit is independent of the others, the more claims the white
collar plaintiff purchases, the more he will be willing to pay for
them. The reason is that, by owning many claims, the white collar
plaintiff diversifies out much of the riskiness of the claims so that
the risk-discounted value of the claims to him is close to the full
$50,000 average expected recovery. Put another way, by eliminating
the riskiness of his investment, he can afford to accept a lower rate
of return. 2 Furthermore, because his portfolio of lottery tickets
is diversified, he can obtain a loan against the lottery tickets, which
allows him to leverage his investment even more. Taking diversifi-
cation a step further, if the white collar plaintiff pools all his lottery
tickets and syndicates them, he can afford to pay even more for
each claim, since he has reduced the risk to a level that an ordinary
investor can afford and, thus, has a much lower cost of capital.
B. Secondary Benefits of Superior Risk-Bearing
Although it is generally in the best interests of litigants to settle
their disputes, 3 litigants often do not settle, or settle only after
spending huge sums on litigation. This failure is due in large part
to the strategic bargaining behavior of the parties.3 4 At least two
" Contingent fee lawyers are an example of a diversified claim-holder. By virtue
of their holding a stake in several claims, they are diversified and place a greater value
on any particular claim than a nondiversified party, such as a private plaintiff. See id.
at 567 (discussing the advantage of contingent fees: "Risk is reduced because the
lawyer specializing in contingent fee matters can pool many claims and thereby
minimize the variance of the returns").
2 See id. (discussing how a contingent fee attorney pools many claims to reduce
risk and minimize variance of the returns).
" Through settlement, both parties can save their respective costs of litigation.
See Robert Cooter et al., Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law: A Testable Model of
Strategic Behavior, 11 J. LEGAL STUD. 225, 225 (1982) (stating that a trial "represents
a bargaining breakdown").
34 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 487-92 (describing strategic bargaining
problems that occur in settlement negotiations). But see Russell Korobkin & Chris
Guthrie, Psychological Barriers to Litigation Settlement: An Experimental Approach, 93
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types of strategic bargaining problems can be cured by the free
trade of claims to better risk-bearing parties: threat credibility and
bilateral monopolies.
1. The Credibility of the Threat to Litigate
Returning once again to the first lottery ticket scenario, the
lottery company, correctly assuming that the blue collar plaintiff will
abandon her claim, will not offer her even a minimal settlement. If
she threatens to sue the lottery company, the lottery company will
call her bluff, rationally assuming that she is unwilling to gamble her
life's savings on the lawsuit. Suppose, however, that the blue collar
plaintiff decides to commence the lawsuit against the lottery
company to bolster her threat of litigation in the hopes of inducing
a settlement offer. She spends $2000 on legal fees to file a
complaint. At this point, the lottery company will take her threat
to litigate a bit more seriously, although not seriously enough to
make her a good faith settlement offer. On the outside chance that
she is actually willing to gamble $25,000 and litigate, the lottery
company will offer her a $5000 settlement. The theory is that, even
if she is actually willing to gamble $25,000; she will not be willing to
gamble $28,000."5 The blue collar plaintiff, seeing the success of
her bluff, might reject the $5000 settlement offer and continue to
bluff her willingness to gamble $28,000 on the lawsuit, in the hopes
that the lottery company will continue its behavior and offer a larger
settlement. To bolster her threat to litigate, she might have to
spend another $3000 on legal fees to commence discovery. The
lottery company, in turn, might counter with a $10,000 settlement
offer and, thus, increase the gamble to $30,000.6 This process will
continue until either the plaintiff is satisfied with the lottery
company's settlement offer or the lottery company calls her bluff
and takes all settlement offers off the table.
The ability to bluff, a strategic bargaining tactic, helps the blue
collar plaintiff who is not actually willing to gamble on her lawsuit,
by allowing her to extract at least some settlement. If the blue
collar plaintiff, however, is not bluffing but seriously intends to go
forward with her lawsuit, the ability to bluff hurts her, because her
MICH. L. REV. 107, 117 (1994) (describing psychological impediments to settlement).
"' $28,000 represents the foregone $5000 settlement offer plus the additional
$23,000 necessary to prosecute the claim.
6 $30,000 represents the foregone $10,000 settlement offer plus the additional
$20,000 necessary to prosecute the claim.
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threat to litigate is not credible and, thus, will not bring the lottery
company to the bargaining table with a good faith settlement offer.
If the lottery company knew that the blue collar plaintiff's threat to
litigate was serious, they would prefer to settle and save the costs of
litigation. But the lottery company rationally assumes that she is
bluffing. The problem is that the plaintiff cannot convince the
lottery company to take her threats seriously until she spends
substantial amounts of money on litigation, at which point much of
the settlement gains have been spent.
In contrast, this problem would not occur with the white collar
plaintiff.3 7 The lottery company, knowing that it would be perfectly
rational for the white collar plaintiff to "invest" $25,000 in his
lawsuit, will not be skeptical of the white collar plaintiff's threats to
litigate. Therefore, the lottery company will make a good faith
settlement offer immediately, and both parties will save the costs of
litigation. The credibility of the threat to litigate is even stronger
when the plaintiff is a litigation investment company, whose
business is to invest in and conduct litigation. The moral of the
story: When claims are traded from poorer risk-bearing parties to
better risk-bearing parties, aside from the inherent efficiency gains,
there are secondary gains from removing inefficient strategic
bargaining problems that disrupt settlement."
2. Bilateral Monopolies
In settlement negotiations between a plaintiff and a defen-
dant, the defendant attempts to "buy" or settle the plaintiff's
claim, and the plaintiff seeks to "sell" the claim to the defendant.
The parties bargain over the price of this sale. Because the defen-
dant is the only buyer interested in the plaintiff's claim, the
defendant can threaten to walk away from the bargaining table
(that is, force a trial) if the plaintiff asks too high a price. Simi-
"7See Simon, supra note 21, at 11 (noting that "by giving claim holders the
financial power to litigate properly and the staying power to go to trial if necessary,
[lawsuit] syndication helps claimants obtain more favorable settlements").
'a Ironically, one of the policy arguments advanced against selling lawsuits is that
it discourages settlement. See Killian v. Millard, 228 Cal. App. 3d 1601, 1604 (Ct.
App. 1991) (citing the lower court's opinion that champertous agreements are against
public policy because they "discourage[] settlements"). This argument confuses the
ability to extract a higher settlement with the willingness to settle. See Simon, supra
note 21, at 12-13 ("It is true that wealthy plaintiffs can afford trial better than poor
plaintiffs, but that is likely to translate into more favorable settlements, not more
trials.").
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larly, because the plaintiff is the only one who can sell the claim
to the defendant, the plaintiff can also threaten to walk away from
the sale (that is, go to trial) if the defendant offers too little.
This is a bilateral monopoly, a situation in which both parties have
an incentive to hold out for a better deal.3 9 This holdout prob-
lem causes the parties to litigate (either to bolster their hold-
out threats or because the settlement negotiations have reached
an impasse) even though settling would be beneficial to both par-
ties.4 0
The ability to sell claims destroys this bilateral monopoly and
cures the holdout problem. From the plaintiff's point of view, the
defendant's holdout threat is useless because there are other buyers
who are competing to purchase the plaintiff's claim. From the
defendant's point of view, holding out for a lower sale price might
result in the sale of the claim to a third party who is more eager to
go to trial and will not be forced into settlement by the defendant's
holdout. The plaintiff has less of an incentive to hold out as well,
because his high demands will drive other potential buyers away and
he will lose his threat to sell the claim. In this manner, the sale of
lawsuits eliminates another strategic bargaining obstacle to
settlement.
In summary, there are potential gains from the sale of claims,
which indicate the existence of a potential market for the trade of
claims and argue for the encouragement of claim-trading. Further-
more, as the lottery ticket hypothetical illustrates, contrary to
popular belief, the trade of claims may promote equity as well as
efficiency.
41
39 Seegenerally EDWIN MANSFIELD, MICROECONOMICS: SELECTED READINGS 296-97
(3d ed. 1976) (discussing the bilateral monopoly problem).
By settling, the parties gain, not only by eliminating the costs of litigation, but
also by eliminating the risk of the uncertain outcome of the litigation.
41 See generally Peter C. Choharis, A Comprehensive Market Strategy for Tort
Reform, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 435, 435 (1995) (arguing that a market for selling,
purchasing, and trading tort claims "will benefit tort victims with quicker,
higher, and certain damage awards; offer defendants numerous ways to hedge their
liability; reduce crowded court dockets and induce faster, fairer settlements;
and help society by retaining appropriate safety incentives and allocating the
costs of accidents to those most able to bear them"); Simon, supra note 21, at
11 ("Syndicating lawsuits has advantages for both individuals and the public at
large.").
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II. CHAMPERCO
In light of the market for claim trading explored in the previous
Part, this Part defines a hypothetical litigation investment company,
appropriately named Champerco, that will be used throughout the
rest of this Comment as a vehicle for analyzing the legal limitations
to investing in litigation.
Champerco is a publicly traded New Jersey corporation that
seeks to develop a market for claim trading. Champerco's opera-
tions are divided among three departments: Claim Procurement,
Litigation, and Investor Services.
A. Claim Procurement
Champerco advertises in law journals and other legal publica-
tions, offering a variety of financial services for litigants. These
advertisements are targeted at lawyers whose clients are either in
need of financial assistance to prosecute their claims, in need of
cash while they wait for their expected recovery, seeking alternative
billing arrangements, or simply looking to "cash out" of their
lawsuits without further involvement.4 2 As an incentive, referring
lawyers receive a fee for their referrals. Champerco also targets
lawyers who have taken cases on a contingent fee basis but need
financial or other support for the prosecution of their clients'
claims.
Champerco advertises in trade journals and other business
publications, as well. These advertisements are targeted at potential
plaintiffs, typically inventors, who have been discouraged from
prosecuting their patent, copyright, or antitrust claims because they
lack the funds or cannot afford the risks of litigation. On occasion,
Champerco engages in more active solicitation of clients through
mass mailings or direct contact with potential clients. Champerco
also actively solicits trustees in bankruptcy and other receivers or
administrators, whose duty it is to liquidate a business or estate, and
offers them immediate cash for their claims.
43
42 See Simon, supra note 21, at 11 ("Alternatively, claim holders who choose to sell
their entire claims can obtain immediate cash in exchange for legal claims that may
take years to resolve and ultimately yield no return. In effect, the claim holder
receives the settlement value of the claim right away .... ").
" See infra note 88 (discussing New York's bankruptcy exception to its champerty
statute).
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When a plaintiff applies for financing, the claim procurement
department interviews the client, investigates the facts, and
researches the law to determine the merit, the risks, and the
potential recovery of the plaintiffs claim. If the plaintiff is already
represented by a lawyer, Champerco will interview the lawyer as well
as the client and will require the plaintiff to waive the lawyer's duty
of confidentiality." Based on Champerco's evaluation of a
plaintiffs claim, Champerco will offer the option of either assign-
ment, partial sale, or loan to the plaintiff.
1. Assignment
Under this option, the plaintiff assigns his entire title and
interest in his lawsuit to Champerco. Champerco pays the plaintiff
with either cash or shares in the litigation proceeds, or some
combination of the two. If the plaintiff's testimony or other
cooperation is necessary, Champerco will generally insist that the
plaintiff retain a sufficient interest in the proceeds in order to
preserve an incentive for his cooperation. In any event, Champerco
will generally require the plaintiff's consent to continue or bring the
lawsuit in the plaintiffs name. This requirement serves two
purposes. First, it preserves the secrecy of Champerco's identity as
the real party in interest, which is necessary to prevent any
prejudice to Champerco from the jury." Second, bringing the suit
in the plaintiff-assignor's name prevents the defendant from
challenging Champerco's standing as a real party in interest.46
If the plaintiff is not yet represented by a lawyer, Champerco's
litigation department will represent Champerco in the prosecution
of the purchased claim. If the plaintiff has already retained a'
lawyer, Champerco will continue to retain that lawyer, with
Champerco substituted as the client, unless the lawyer agrees to be
bought out. This policy is necessary in order not to discourage
lawyers from referring their clients to Champerco. If the plaintiff s
44 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(a) (1994) ("A lawyer
shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client unless the client
consents after consultation .... ").
45 The sympathy factor of the plaintiff's claim will be diminished significantly if
thejury is aware that any reward will go, not to the plaintiff, but to a corporation that
purchased the claim at a price equal to a fraction of what the jury is prepared to
award to the plaintiff.
46 See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) ("Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest."). Champerco is only a real party in interest if it has established
that it has a valid agreement with the plaintiff. See infra part III.C.
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lawyer decides to remain on the case, Champerco's litigation
department will provide support as is necessary. In all events,
Champerco will acquire title to the claim, it will be the client, and
it will exercise complete authority and control over the litigation,
even if the plaintiff retains a significant share in the proceeds and
the original lawyer remains. Because title to the claim will transfer
to Champerco, there will be no lawyer-client relationship with the
plaintiff and, thus, there will be no resulting attorney duties owed
to the plaintiff-assignor.47
2. Partial Sale
Under this option, the plaintiff sells to Champerco shares in the
litigation proceeds. Champerco pays the plaintiff either with cash
or with an agreement to bear all the litigation expenses, or both. If
the plaintiff is not yet represented, instead of paying the plaintiff's
attorneys' fees, Champerco's litigation department may represent
the plaintiff, much like an ordinary contingent fee arrangement. In
any event, the plaintiff will remain the client and have total control
over the litigation. This option is more palatable to plaintiffs that
are simply seeking to finance their lawsuits, rather than "cash them
out."
3. Loan
Under this final option, Champerco lends the plaintiff money,
secured by the plaintiff's claim. The loan is a nonrecourse loan,
meaning that repayment of the debt is either satisfied out of the
proceeds of the lawsuit or not at all. Naturally, the loan is at a very
high rate of interest because of the riskiness of the collateral.
Champerco also offers to guarantee other lenders' loans to
plaintiffs, which are secured by their lawsuits, for a substantial up-
front guarantee fee.48 Champerco generally only offers the loan
option to plaintiffs with low-risk claims.
"' This transfer of identity may place the plaintiff's lawyer in an awkward position
during Champerco's negotiations with the plaintiff, as she represents, at some point,
each party to the negotiation and might even have an interest of her own. See MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(b) (1994) ("A lawyer shall not use
information relating to representation of a client to the disadvantage of the client
unless the client consents after consultation .... ").
48 A guarantee fee is simply the fee charged for guaranteeing the loan. It is
usually a percentage of the loan.
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B. Litigation
The litigation department serves several functions. First, it helps
the claim procurement department evaluate claims. Second, it
participates in all aspects of litigation. Under the assignment
option, the litigation department manages the litigation, making all
of the decisions that a client would normally make, and either
litigates the claim itself or provides support and assistance for
another lawyer to litigate the claim for Champerco. Under the
partial sale option, the litigation department either represents
plaintiffs, provides support to their lawyers, or helps plaintiffs find
lawyers. Under the loan option, the litigation department only
determines the appropriate interest rate to charge the plaintiff-
borrower by evaluating the riskiness of the claim. At the plaintiff's
request, however, Champerco may, in its discretion, offer, at no
charge, the help of the litigation department's resources and
expertise.4 9
C. Investor Services
Champerco also offers investors several avenues for investing in
litigation. Investors seeking the greatest possible returns can invest
directly in specific lawsuits. These direct investments offer the
greatest returns because these investments are undiluted, but also
involve the highest risks because they are undiversified.5 Direct
investors may either buy shares in the lawsuits that Champerco
already owns, or Champerco may act as a broker, matching up
investors with plaintiffs and charging a brokerage fee.5'
Most investors, however, will seek some degree of diversifica-
tion. One way for investors to diversify is to become shareholders
in Champerco, the corporation. However, there may not be a liquid
market for Champerco's shares, and shareholders may want greater
control over the distribution of Champerco's profits.
Champerco offers investors another diversified way to invest in
litigation. Rather than buying individual litigation securities,
investors can pool their monies by buying units of Champerco's
mutual fund, Champerfund. The monies in Champerfund are used
to buy shares in various lawsuits, thereby assembling a diversified
49 See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4(a) (1994) ("A lawyer or
law firm shall not share legal fees with a nonlawyer .. .
5 See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
5' See Simon, supra note 21, at 10-11.
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portfolio of litigation securities.5 2 Investors have the option of
reinvesting their Champerfund dividends, receiving their dividends,
or redeeming their units entirely on demand.
In addition to being financed by equity from shareholders and
investors, Champerco is debt-financed. Investors can make loans to
Champerco, secured by Champerco's portfolio of lawsuits.
Investors receive premium interest rates because of the high-risk
nature of these loans. If necessary, Champerco can also engage
investors to guarantee the loans for a substantial guarantee fee.
Alternatively, Champerco can guarantee an investor's direct loan to
a plaintiff.
III. CHAMPERTY
A. History and Policy
Champerty is defined as a "bargain between a stranger and a
party to a lawsuit by which the stranger pursues the party's claim in
consideration of receiving part of any judgment proceeds."
5 3
Champerty is one type of "maintenance," a term that "refers to
maintaining, supporting, or promoting another person's litiga-
tion."54 The doctrines of champerty and maintenance are ancient,
reaching as far back as the ancient Greek and Roman law and the
doctrines of sykophanteia and calumnia.5"
Common law champerty doctrine developed as part of the
resistance to the rise of capitalism that occurred around the
Renaissance period. Persons with capital would agree to bear the
expenses and share the results of a lawsuit for the recovery of
land.57 This type of "transaction in medieval eyes was tainted with
that speculation which was the essence of the abhorred sin of usu-
52 See id. at 11 ("Still other companies might assemble portfolios of litigation and
sell equity interests in their portfolios to the public."). See generally Donald L.
Abraham, Note, Investor-Financed Lawsuits: A Proposal to Remove Two Barriers to an
Alternative Form ofLitigation Financing, 43 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1297 (1992) (arguing that
litigation securities should not be subject to securities regulation).
51 BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 231 (6th ed. 1990) (citing Alexander v. Unification
Church, 634 F.2d 673, 677 (2d Cir. 1980)).
54Id.
" See Max Radin, Maintenance By Champerty, 24 CAL. L. REV. 48, 49, 52-54
(1935). Sykophanteia and calumnia are doctrines against sycophants and
calumniators, people who institute baseless litigation for their own gain. See id. at 49,
53.
6 See id. at 65.
57 See id. at 60.
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ry."58 In fact, the word "champerty" derives from champart, a type
of feudal tenure in land that lent itself most easily to the evasion of
laws against usury.59
Common law maintenance doctrine developed during feudal
times in England in response to the practice of feudal magnates to
maintain all of their retainers' lawsuits, whether justified or not, in
order to aggrandize their estates."0 These and other abuses of the
judicial process abounded in the middle ages. 1 One particularly
pernicious practice was the selling or assigning of a pretended right
in land to persons of great power or influence, who would use their
rank to further the prosecution of their lawsuits and oppress the
possessors of the lands.62 This problem was exacerbated where
trial by combat prevailed and litigants assigned their claims to
champion fighters.6 3 Similar concerns led the Talmud, hundreds
of years earlier, to frown upon the purchase of disputed titles in
land."
Another force that drove the development of ancient champerty
and maintenance doctrine was the desire to discourage litigation,
even if such litigation was meritorious.6 5 The rise of Christianity
infused into the law the Christian attitude that litigation was itself
something to be discouraged, even if the claim was well-founded.6 6
Forgiving debts was considered to be a fundamental Christian
virtue, and recourse to secular law courts was discountenanced.6 7
Trafficking in litigation was therefore naturally discouraged.
"8 Id. at 60-61.
59 See id. at 61-63, 65-66.
60 See id. at 64.
61 See Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 12 (Or. 1891) ("So great was the evil of rich and
powerful barons buying up claims, and, by means of their exalted and influential
positions, overawing the courts, and thus securing unjust and unmeritedjudgments,
... that it became necessary ... to invoke in all its rigor the doctrine against
champerty and maintenance.").
62 See id. ("The doctrine [of champerty and maintenance] was established 'to
repress the practices of many who, when they thought they had title or right to any
land, for the furtherance of their pretended right conveyed their interest, or some
part thereof, to great persons, and with their countenance did oppress the
possessors.'" (citation omitted)).
65 See Radin, supra note 55, at 58-59.
64 See BABYLONIAN TALMUD, tractate Shevovoth 31a (stating that one who buys
disputed titles in land, relying on his superior strength to take possession, is evil in
the eyes of the law).
" See Radin, supra note 55, at 56.
66 See id.
67 See id.
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There is also a hint of paternalism in some of the earliest
examples of the rule against champerty. For example, under Roman
law, the purchase of choses in action was allowed, unless pendente
lite, until a famous constitution of the Emperor Anastasius forbade
it in 506 A.D. on the grounds that the purchasers were "'devour[ing]
the property or fortunes of others'" by inducing the plaintiffs to
part with their claims for sums far below their actual value.6" For
similar reasons, the early common law prohibited a popular form of
champerty in which the wealthier of two joint claimants bought out
the other claimant.69
Over the last several centuries, the laws against champerty and
maintenance have eroded considerably, leading many courts, as
early as the nineteenth century, to pronounce the doctrine ancient
and obsolete."0 Nevertheless, common law champerty, at least in
some form, continues to be either illegal, against public policy, or
even criminal in most states.
The contemporary justification for laws against champerty and
maintenance is far from obvious. 72 Most of the policies that drove
the development of common law champerty are now obsolete.73
Feudalism died, as did the resistance to capitalism. The administra-
tion of justice is no longer so weak and corrupt that the judicial
process can be used as an "engine of oppression."74 The view that
even meritorious claims should be discouraged and, instead,
forgiven, no longer prevails.
7 5
' Id. at 55 (citation omitted).
69 See id. at 60.
70 See, e.g., Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 13 (Or. 1891) (noting that champerty laws
are narrowly applied "[t]o meet the changed condition of society"); see also 14 AM.
JUR. 2D Champerty & Maintenance § 1 (1964) ("In many states [the doctrines of
champerty and maintenance] are declared to be obsolete .... ."); 14 CJ.S. Champerty
&Maintenance § 3 (1991) (noting that the "concept ofchamperty has been narrowed,
tempered, and mellowed in modern times").
71 See infra part III.B (discussing the various modern approaches to champerty
law).
' See Radin, supra note 55, at 71 ("If we dealt with this as a matter of abstract
logic, it would be hard to justify the objection to champerty either in the case of lay
champertors or lawyers.").
7 See Bigne, 28 P. at 12 (stating that the doctrine of "champerty and maintenance
... arose from causes peculiar to the state of society in which it was established");
Radin, supra note 55, at 66 ("[T]he background against which the law of champerty
and maintenance grew up ... has disappeared.").
74 Bigne, 28 P. at 12 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *135).
' See Radin, supra note 55, at 66 ("The condemnation of litigiousness.., remains
... a common element in the medieval and modern attitudes, but neither then nor
now did it play a controlling role."); Simon, supra note 21, at 11 (stating that "lawsuits
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Almost a century ago, in Peck v. Heurich,76 the Supreme Court
stated that champertous agreements, at least between a plaintiff and
an attorney, are "contrary to public policy, unlawful, and void, as
tending to stir up baseless litigation."" Ironically, the one type of
champertous agreement that has gained widespread acceptance is
the contingent fee agreement between an attorney and a client.7"
Nevertheless, the most popular modern objection to champertous
agreements between laymen and plaintiffs is that they tend to stir
up frivolous litigation.
79
Other policy justifications for the law against champerty have
been offered as well. 0 The law might seek to encourage settle-
ment,8 ' to prevent unauthorized practice of law by corporations,"
to prevent strife, discord, and harassment,8 3 or to prevent traffick-
ing and speculating in litigation.
8 4
are considered one of the marks of a civilized society").
76 167 U.S. 624 (1897).
77 Id. at 630.
' Contingent fee agreements, although technically champertous, are generally
legal in the United States if they are reasonable. See 14 C.J.S. Champerty &
Maintenance § 11 (1991).
79 See 14 C.J.S. Champerty &Maintenance § 2 (1991) ("The laws against champerty
... are aimed at the prevention of multitudinous and useless lawsuits .... ."); infra
part IV.D.2 (discussing this objection as a basis for champerty laws).
" For a realist view of the modern justification for champerty laws, see Radin,
supra note 55, at 66 (blaming the elitist members of the bar and their protectionist
irterests for the law against champerty).
" See Simon, supra note 21, at 11 (stating that champerty "may impede
settlements, since well-heeled investors may be more willing than individuals to
gamble at trial").
82 See Knobel v. Estate of Eugene A. Hoffman Inc., 432 N.Y.S.2d 66, 67 (App. Div.
1980) (noting that the purpose of Judiciary Law § 489 is to prevent champertous
agreements and the unauthorized practice of law by corporations).
' See Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 270 N.E.2d 691, 693
(N.Y. 1971) (noting that the "legislative concern [behindJudiciary Law § 489] is...
[the] prevent[ion of] ... strife, discord and harassment which could result from
permitting attorneys and corporations to purchase claims for the purpose of bringing
actions thereon").
' See e.g., Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 66 (1st Cir. 1994) (declaring that the
"'single serious purpose'" of the Puerto Rico champerty statute is "'to discourage
financial speculation in litigation'" (quoting Pritzker v. Yari, No. CIV.92-2825, 1993
WL 71760, at *5 (D.P.R. Mar. 5, 1993))); Koro Co. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 568 F. Supp.
280, 288 (D.D.C. 1983) (finding that New York's champerty statute was "designed to
prevent trafficking and speculation in lawsuits"); see also 14 C.J.S. Champerty &
Maintenance § 2 (1991) ("The laws against champerty ... are aimed at ... the
prevention of speculation in litigation.").
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B. Modern Champerty Law
Although states take different approaches to champerty,
champerty runs contrary to public policy in almost every state. In
some states, champerty is prohibited by statute, in others by
common law, and in others by rule of public policy. This Part
explores a sampling of several states' champerty laws, grouped by
their different approaches.
1. Statute: New York 5
The New York legislature has expressed its strong public policy
against champerty in section 489 of the Judiciary Law. 6 The
statute makes no reference to "champerty," but it clearly spells out
a broad prohibition against it:
No person or co-partnership... and no corporation or association
... shall solicit, buy or take an assignment of, or be in any manner
interested in buying or taking an assignment of a bond, promis-
sory note, bill of exchange, book debt, or other thing in action, or
any claim or demand, with the intent and for the purpose of
bringing an action or proceeding thereon .... [A]ny person ...
violating the provisions of this section ... is guilty of a misde-
meanor.
8 7
The intent of the New York Legislature to thwart investment in
litigation is clear from the sheer breadth of the statute's prohibi-
tion,8 8 and its policy against speculating in litigation is clear from
85 Mississippi has also adopted a statutory approach to regulating champerty. See
MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-9-11 (1994).
8 See N.Y.JUD. LAW § 489 (McKinney 1983).
7 Id.
" The statute, however, carves out one very significant exception to its prohibition
of investing in litigation:
[B]ills receivable, notes receivable, bills of exchange, judgments or other
things in action maybe solicited, bought, or assignment thereof taken, from
any executor, administrator, assignee for the benefit of creditors, trustee or
receiver in bankruptcy, or any other person or persons in charge of the
administration, settlement or compromise of any estate, through court
actions, proceedings or otherwise.
Id. This exception freely allows the purchase of claims from trustees and the like who
are in charge of winding up an estate. The purpose of the exception is to facilitate
expeditious liquidation and final settlement of certain estates. See People v. Berlin,
317 N.Y.S.2d 191, 194 (Nassau County Ct. 1971). Although this exception is narrow,
it provides a significant market for investing in litigation because such plaintiffs are
likely to be very eager to cash out and liquidate their claims, which is precisely the
purpose of the exception. See, e.g., In re Resorts Int'l, Inc., 145 B.R. 412, 474 (D.NJ.
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the statute's focus on intent.
Because investing in litigation is illegal, champertous agreements
are void.89 A lawsuit brought by a champertous assignee will be
dismissed.9" Even when an agreement does not actually violate the
New York champerty statute because another state's laws apply, New
York will refuse to entertain a lawsuit based on the agreement if the
agreement is illegal under New York law.9' Nevertheless, New York
will not go so far as to dismiss a lawsuit brought by a bona fide
plaintiff who happened to enter into an illegal champertous
agreement with a third party.
2
1990) (upholding, under the bankruptcy exception of § 489, the validity of a
Litigation Trust to which a bankrupt debtor assigned its claims and then distributed
shares in the trust to its creditors); Investment Opportunities, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 4, 1995,
at B19 (advertising the sale, by a bankruptcy estate, of a 51% interest in a $28.8
millionjudgment on writ of appeal). Interestingly, the statute's exception is a candid
admission by the New York Legislature that speculatingin litigation is not necessarily
undesirable or harmful.
" See Lee v. Community Capital Corp., 324 N.Y.S.2d 583, 585 (Sup. Ct. 1971)
("[A] party.to an illegal.., act or transaction cannot base a cause of action on such
act or transaction."). Generally, champertous agreements will violate the letter of the
statute. But where an agreement does not violate the letter of the statute, it will be
valid and enforceable even though it is against New York's public policy against
champerty. See Lost Lots Assocs. v. Bruyn, 415 N.Y.S.2d 99, 100 (App. Div. 1979)
(holding that champerty is only viable as a defense as provided by statute).
"o See Refac Int'l, Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 131 F.R.D. 56, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1990)
(holding that the champertous assignee could not maintain a patent-infringement
claim because it was "not the real party in interest," but was only a "surrogate
plaintiff").
"' See American Optical Co. v. Curtiss, 56 F.R.D. 26, 30 (S.D.N.Y. 1971) (stating
that a plaintiff"should not be permitted to sue in [New York] on a[n]... action...
which would not be enforced by New York Courts"). For a further discussion of this
case, see infra notes 250-59 and accompanying text.
9 Compare Knobel v. Estate of Eugene A. Hoffman Inc., 432 N.Y.S.2d 66 (Sup. Ct.
1980) with American Optical Co. v. Curtiss, 59 F.R.D. 644 (S.D.N.Y. 1973) and
American Optical Co. v. Curtiss, 56 F.R.D. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1971). Knobel held that the
statute prohibits taking assignment of a claim with the intent to sue whether the claim
is structured to appear to belong to the assignee or to the assignor. See Knobel, 432
N.Y.S.2d at 68. American Optical indirectly held that the court could refuse to
entertain a lawsuit brought by a champertous assignee, although it could not refuse
to entertain the same lawsuit brought in the assignor's name, regardless of the
existence of a champertous assignment. See American Optical, 56 F.R.D. at 32
(dismissing the complaint unless the University, the real plaintiff, was joined or
substituted as party plaintiff within 10 days).
Neither Knobel nor American Optical, however, is directly on point. Knobel dealt
only with the reach of the statute's prohibition, not with its viability as a defense.
American Optical did not directly deal with a violation of the champerty statute; the
court simply refused to entertain the lawsuit because it was contrary to New York's
policy embodied in the statute. The court, nevertheless, allowed the champertous
assignee to bring the claim if it joined the assignor as a plaintiff. In any event, there
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2. Legal Champerty: New Jersey
New Jersey has neither adopted the English champerty statutes
and common law nor otherwise maintained the public policy against
champerty93 In one of the earliest lawsuit syndication cases,9 4 the
New Jersey Court of Chancery held that speculation in lawsuits
violates neither the law nor the public policy of New Jersey.
9 5
Agreements to buy lawsuits or shares of the proceeds thereof are,
therefore, valid and enforceable like any other contract. In fact, a
New Jersey statute explicitly makes all lawsuits arising out of
contracts assignable.
96
3. Common Law: Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania is one of several jurisdictions that maintains the
vintage common law doctrine against champerty9 In the leading
is almost no precedent holding that an action by a bona fide plaintiff can be
dismissed by virtue of a bona fide plaintiff's champertous agreement with a third
party. See L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Assertion of Defense of Champerty in Action By
Champertous Assignee, 22 A.L.R.2d 1000, § 3, at 1011 (1952).
11 SeeJ ex rel. Ay. D, 482 A.2d 531, 534 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1984) ("The
doctrine[] of... champerty do[es] not prevail in New Jersey ... ."); Sweeney v.
Veneziano, 175 A.2d 241, 245 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1961) (holding that a suit for legal
services by a partnership composed of defendant and another was permissive
considering NewJersey's policy favoring champerty); Bouvier v. Baltimore & N.Y. Ry.,
51 A. 781, 784 (N.J. 1902) (departing from English common law in holding that
champerty and maintenance doctrines are inapplicable). But see Stanford v. Werder,
20 N.J. LJ. 56, 59 (Dist. Ct. 1897) (finding one particular champertous agreement
contrary to public policy).
94 See Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 71 A. 153 (N.J.
Ch. 1908).
9' The court unequivocally enunciated New Jersey's permissive attitude toward
trading in litigation:
Neither the law nor the policy of NewJersey prohibits what complainant is
pleased to call a speculation in a lawsuit. In this state we have not adopted
the English statutes of champerty and maintenance.... And with us the
assignment of choses in action has from an early day been encouraged.
Id. at 167.
9 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:25-1 (West 1985) ("[A]ll choses in action arising on
contract shall be assignable .... ").
17 See, e.g., Kenrich Corp. v. Miller, 377 F.2d 312, 314 (3d Cir. 1967) ("Under the
common law of Pennsylvania, an arrangement offends public policy against champerty
and is illegal if it provides for the institution of litigation by and at the expense of a
person who, but for that agreement, has no interest in it, with the understanding that
his reward is to be a share of whatever proceeds the litigation may yield."); Keiper v.
Miller, 68 F. 627, 630 (E.D. Pa. 1895) (dismissing a patent-infringement suit and
holding that an agreement between the patentee and an attorney, which assigned the
patent to the attorney so that the attorney could prosecute infringement suits in his
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case on champerty, 98 a corporation assigned its rights in a deriva-
tive suit against its former directors in exchange for a share of the
proceeds." The assignee, Jerome Kline, was the former president,
director, and principal shareholder of the company.100  The
assignment agreement called for Kline to present to the company
the factual basis for the derivative suit.' °1 The company would
then have a choice either to sue in its own name, with Kline
receiving 25% of the proceeds, or to assign the claim to Kline, who
would then sue in his own name and retain 66% of the pro-
ceeds.10 2 The company elected not to sue in its own name and
assigned its rights in the suit to Kline, who brought suit in his own
name and share the recoveries with the patentee, was champertous and, therefore,
void); Ames v. Hillside Coal & Iron Co., 171 A. 610, 610 (Pa. 1934) ("While there has
been some relaxation in the application of the common-law doctrines of champerty
and maintenance in this.. .jurisdiction[], champerty, repugnant to public policy, is
still ground for denying the aid of the court.").
For cases in other jurisdictions that retain the common law rule against
champerty, see Parks v. American Warrior, Inc., 44 F.3d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 1995)
(recognizing that the doctrine of champerty exists in Oklahoma, although it cannot
be used as a defense against a bona fide plaintiff); Design for Business Interiors v.
Herson's, Inc., 659 F. Supp. 1103, 1108 (D.D.C. 1987) ("'Ifa contract is determined
to be champertous, District of Columbia courts will not enforce it.'" (quoting Marshall
v. Bickel, 445 A.2d 606, 609 (D.C. 1982))); Hall v. State, 655 A.2d 827, 830 (Del.
Super. Ct. 1994) (stating that "the doctrine [of champerty and maintenance]
continues to have vitality in this State"); Boettcher v. Criscione, 299 P.2d 806, 811
(Kan. 1956) (stating that "[w]hether champerty... is in violation of public policy...
turns largely on the facts and circumstances of each case"); McCullar v. Credit Bureau
Sys., 832 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Ky. 1992) (holding that the "champerty doctrine remains
viable [but] only as a defense in a contract action"); Curry v. Dahlberg, 110 S.W.2d
742, 748 (Mo. 1937) ("The law of champerty and maintenance is in force in this
state."); McKellips v. Macintosh, 475 N.W.2d 926, 929 (S.D. 1991) ("[T]he doctrines
of champerty and maintenance currently apply in South Dakota.").
Other jurisdictions retain the common law against champerty but limit its
application to champertous agreements that are against public policy. See, e.g.,
American Hotel Management Assoc. v. Jones, 768 F.2d 562, 571 (4th Cir. 1985)
("Champerty and maintenance will not be found 'unless the interference is clearly
officious and for the purpose ofstirringup strife and continuing litigation.'" (quoting
Smith v. Hartsell, 63 S.E. 172, 174 (N.C. 1908)) (citations omitted)); Lott v. Kees, 165
So. 2d 106, 110 (Ala. 1964) ("[W]hen such contracts are made for the purpose of
stirring up strife and litigation, harassing others, inducing suits to be begun which
otherwise would not be commenced, or for speculation they come within the analogy
and principles of [the] doctrine [of champerty], and should not be enforced."
(quoting Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 13 (Or. 1891))).
98 See Kenrich Corp. v. Miller, 377 F.2d 312 (3d Cir. 1967).
99 See id. at 313-14.
100 See id. at 313.
101 See id. at 313-14.
102 See id. at 314.
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name."' The district court held that the assignment agreement
was champertous and illegal under Pennsylvania law and dismissed
the suit with prejudice as to Kline but without prejudice as to the
company.104 The Third Circuit affirmed.'0 5
This case shapes many of the contours of Pennsylvania's
champerty doctrine. By dismissing the suit with prejudice only as
to Kline, the champertous assignee, the Third Circuit held that a
defendant has standing to raise the defense of champerty against an
assignee suing in its own name, but that an assignor does not forfeit
its rights in the action by virtue of its champertous agreement.
Thus, a defendant has no standing to assert the plaintiff's champer-
tous contract with a third party as a defense against the plaintiff-
assignor.'05  However, because the agreement would nonetheless
be illegal and invalid, the assignee also could not enforce the agree-
ment against the plaintiff-assignor.
4. Public Policy: California
California has never adopted the common law doctrine of
champerty 0 7 Nevertheless, champertous agreements may be void
as contrary to California public policy,' although there is a
dearth of California precedent finding champertous agreements
void as against public policy.
103 See id. at 313-14.
'0" See id. at 314.
105 See id.
"0 In Augenti v. Cappellini, 499 F. Supp. 50 (M.D. Pa. 1980), the court held that
a "[d]efendant cannot avail himself of the champertous agreement as a defense to the
action." Id. at 51 (citing Burnes v. Scott, 117 U.S. 582, 589 (1886); Bedell v. Oliver
H. Bair Co., 158 A. 651, 653 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1932)).
"o7 See In re Cohen's Estate, 152 P.2d 485, 489 (Cal. Ct. App. 1944) ("California
is one of the many states that has never adopted the common law doctrines of
champerty and maintenance."); Mathewson v. Fitch, 22 Cal. 86, 95 (1863) ("[T]he
offense of maintenance is unknown to the laws of this State.").
A California statute does prohibit attorneys from buying claims with the intent
to sue thereon, but the statute applies only to attorneys. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE
§ 6129 (West 1990). The statute applies only to members of the California Bar, as
the law is based on the Supreme Court of California's power to control its officers.
See id. § 6087.
" Connecticut takes a similar approach to California. Connecticut has not
adopted the common law rule against champerty, but rather applies a public policy
test to determine whether such agreements are valid. See Rice v. Farrell, 28 A.2d 7,
8 (Conn. 1942) ("[T]he common law doctrines of champerty and maintenance as
applied to civil actions have never been adopted in this state, and the only test is
whether a particular transaction is against public policy.").
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In a case that sheds some light on California's champerty law,
Killian v. Millard,"0 9 William Millard, the president of Computer-
land, issued a note to a venture capital firm to finance the start-up
of the company."' The note was convertible after a specified time
into a 20% equity share in Computerland. 1  The plaintiffs
purchased the note from the venture capital company and, after
Millard refused to honor the note, sued to enforce it." 2 Unable
to finance the litigation out of personal funds, the plaintiffs turned
to outside investors."' They offered fifty shares in the proceeds
of the litigation at $10,000 a share." 4 The trial court, however,
granted the defendant's motion to compel the plaintiffs to sever all
ties with the investors and return their money."5 The court held
that the investment scheme violated public policy and was, there-
fore, void." 6 On appeal, the California Court of Appeal reversed,
holding that the defendant lacked standing to challenge the validity
of contracts between the plaintiff and its investors, contracts to
which the defendant was not a party." 7 The California Court of
Appeal did not, however, overturn the lower court's holding that
the lawsuit-syndication scheme violated California public policy, a
holding that may still be the law in California.
5. Civil Law: Puerto Rico and Louisiana
The civil law deals with champerty in a unique fashion.1
8
Under civil law, if a plaintiff sells all or part of his claim, the
defendant may extinguish the claim by redeeming it from the
purchaser for the price he paid plus interest and costs.
119
'0 228 Cal. App. 3d 1601 (Ct. App. 1991); see also Spencer, supra note 4, at 72
(discussing "the most successful investor-financed lawsuit in U.S. history").
1o See Cox, supra note 13, at 157.
"' See id.
112 See id.
113 See id.
11 See Killian, 228 Cal. App. 3d at 1604.
'15 See id. at 1606.
116 See id.
"" See id. at 1607. After the California Supreme Court upheld the jury's verdict,
the investors stood to receive an incredible 1600% return on their investments. See
Spencer, supra note 4, at 72.
"' See generally Mervin H. Riseman, The Sale of a Litigious Right, 13 TUL. L. REV.
448 (1939) (discussing Louisiana law on the purchase of litigious rights). Riseman,
in consonance with almost every other commentator on the subject of champerty,
states that "[iln spite of the policy restraining the purchase of litigious rights by public
officers, there seems to be nothing actually odious in the purchase of such rights by
other parties." Id. at 451.119 See LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2652 (West 1991); P.R. LAWs ANN. tit. 31, § 3950
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In the recent Puerto Rico case of Pritzker v. Yari, 2 ° the plaintiff,
in a breach of contract action, packaged and sold various rights in
the proceeds of his claim in order to finance his fiercely contested
lawsuit.'' When the defendant learned of the agreements through
discovery, he immediately tendered payment to the three investors
to redeem their interests in the lawsuit pursuant to Article 1425, the
Puerto Rico champerty statute.122 Article 1425 gives a debtor the
right to redeem and extinguish a "litigated credit" that is sold. 23
After the investors refused to acknowledge the existence of the
defendant's right of redemption, the defendant brought a collateral
suit to enforce his redemption right.'24 The district court ren-
dered judgment in favor of the defendant (that is, the party exercis-
ing the right of redemption), and the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit affirmed, holding that the case fell squarely within the
language of the statute.
125
In one sense, the civil law approach to champerty favors
defendants because it grants them an independent, enforceable
right of redemption, whereas under the common law of champerty,
the defendant often lacks standing to challenge a champertous
agreement. 126 Yet, under the common law, a champertous agree-
ment may be held invalid, and the investor may lose all of his
money,'2 7 whereas under the civil law, the investor will at least get
his money back, plus interest and costs.
Despite its clear purpose to frustrate "litigious profiteer-
ing,"128 the civil law approach to champerty poses only minor
(1991) (also referred to as "Article 1425").
'o 42 F.3d 53 (1st Cir. 1994).
121 See id. at 58.
12 See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 3950 (1991). Article 1425 states:
When a litigated credit is sold, the debtor shall have the right to extinguish
the same by reimbursing the assignee for the price the later [sic] paid for
it, the judicial costs incurred by him, and the interest on the price from the
day on which the same was paid.... The debtor may make use of his right
within nine (9) days, counted from the day the assignee should demand
payment of him.
Id.
12 See id.
124 See Pritzker, 42 F.3d at 58-59.
12 See id. at 68.
126 See infra part III.C.
127 The investor may be able to recover in restitution.
128 See Pritzker, 42 F.3d at 68. According to the First Circuit, "the district court hit
the bull's-eye when it declared that the 'single, serious purpose' of article 1425 is 'to
discourage financial speculation in litigation.'" Id. at 65-66 (quoting Pritzker v. Yari,
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obstacles to investing in litigation. The reason for this ineffective-
ness is that the defendant must exercise his right of redemption
promptly. Both Puerto Rico and Louisiana make it clear that the
defendant cannot continue to contest the lawsuit, wait and see
whether he succeeds, and then exercise his right of redemption if
he loses.
1 29
The limitation period for exercising a right of redemption puts
litigation investors in a very secure position. In Puerto Rico, for
example, the limitation period is nine days, beginning from the time
the purchaser of the claim demands that the defendant exercise his
right."'3 The defendant must irrevocably tender payment within
that time or lose the right of redemption. Since the course of
litigation, and thus the value of the plaintiff's claim, is unlikely to
change much in the nine-day period, the defendant essentially has
little more than a right of first refusal to buy the plaintiff's claim.
From an investor's perspective, this is an acceptable restriction.
When the investor purchases shares in a lawsuit, he can immediately
notify the defendant and demand the exercise of the right within
nine days.'' If the defendant does not exercise his right promptly,
then the investor's investment is secure, and the defendant has no
recourse. If the defendant does exercise his right promptly, then
the investor gets all of his money back plus interest and costs 13 2-
very nearly a no-lose situation.
Furthermore, the likelihood of the defendant exercising his right
is theoretically low. If the plaintiff was willing to sell her claim to
a third party for X dollars, she would have been willing to settle
with the defendant for X dollars.'33 Since the defendant obviously
was not willing to buy the claim from the plaintiff for X dollars, the
No. CIV.92-2825, 1993 WL 71760, at *5 (D.P.R. Mar. 5, 1993)).
"2 See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 3950 (limiting the right of a debtor to extinguish
litigated credit to nine days from the day the assignee demands payment of him);
A.M. & J. Solari, Ltd. v. Fitzgerald, 150 So. 2d 896, 901 (La. Ct. App. 1963) ("[A]
party seeking to redeem a litigious right must be prompt in making known his
intention... ."); Riseman, supra note 118, at 453 ("If, on learning of the transfer, [a
party] continues to contest the suit, he may not, when he realizes that the judgment
is about to become final or that he is going to lose the suit, avail himself of the
provisions which the law has established in his favor for the purpose of litigation.").
1s0 See P.R. LAWS ANN. tit. 31, § 3950.
131 See id.
132 See id.
Iss There are, of course, psychological factors such as hostility, vindication, and
revenge that may have prevented a settlement even though the amount was right.
Also, strategic bargaining might have prevented the parties from settling regardless
of the amount of the settlement. See supra part I.B.
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defendant would presumably be unwilling to buy it from the third-
party purchaser for X dollars. Logically, therefore, the defendant
will not exercise its right of redemption promptly, and the right will
terminate.
3 4
C. The Practical Impact of Champerty Laws
As this Part has revealed, champerty is generally illegal in most
states. Nevertheless, where champerty and maintenance are not
criminally prohibited, the only effect of champerty laws is to make
champertous agreements unenforceable. In many states, however,
the lack of an enforceable agreement poses a serious obstacle to
buying lawsuits. Since a champertous agreement between a plaintiff
and an investor is invalid, the assignment of the claim is invalid as
well. The investor-assignee, therefore, has no standing as a real
party in interest, and his claim will be dismissed. 5
Some states do not allow defendants to raise champerty as a
defense against a champertous assignee, on the ground that the
defendant has no standing to challenge an agreement to which he
is not a party. 3 6 Most states, however, allow the defense on the
ground that the assignee's standing and entitlement to a judgment
are predicated on the assignment.3 7 The validity of the assign-
ment, therefore, is a necessary element of the investor-assignee's
case, which the defendant can challenge on the ground that the
assignment is champertous and invalid. 3 If the court finds the
assignment void for champerty, the assignee's claim will be
dismissed for lack of standing as a real party in interest.
" The situation, however, is different when the plaintiff sells only a portion of the
claim. Since the plaintiff could not have sold (that is, settled) only a part of his claim
to the defendant, there is less reason to believe that the defendant will not exercise
its right of redemption.
"15 See FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a) ("Every action shall be prosecuted in the name of the
real party in interest."); 6A CHARLES A. WRIGHT & ARTHUR R. MILLER, FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1545, at 350 (1990) (stating that "the court must assure
itself that a valid assignment has been made" (emphasis added)); see also Refac Int'l,
Ltd. v. Lotus Dev. Corp., 131 F.R.D. 56, 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that the
champertous assignee could not maintain a latent-infringement claim because it was
"not the real party in interest," but only a "surrogate plaintiff").
" See Killian v. Millard, 228 Cal. App. 3d 1601, 1605 (Ct. App. 1991) (noting that
Millard lacked standingbecause he "had no substantive right in the contract between
Syndicators and Investors"); Tellier, supra note 92, at 1006 ("[A]lthough an
assignment may be champertous, such champerty is not available as a defense...
"s" See Tellier, supra note 92, at 1003.
13 See 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty &Maintenance § 15 (1964).
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To avoid the risk of dismissal and to take away the defendant's
champerty defense against an investor-assignee, the investor should
either join the plaintiff-assignor as a party or bring the lawsuit in
the plaintiff's name.1 3 9 This, of course, is never a problem when
the investor purchases less than the plaintiff's full interest in the
lawsuit, 4 ' but even when the investor purchases the plaintiff's
entire claim, the investor can bring the lawsuit in the plaintiff's
name. Since, legally, the agreement is invalid, the claim was never
validly assigned, and the plaintiff remains the real party in interest.
Once the plaintiff-assignor is joined or named as the plaintiff,
champerty is no longer available as a defense.1
4 1
Bringing suit in the plaintiff-assignor's name, however, poses
another serious risk to investors. If the plaintiff-assignor is named
as the plaintiff in the lawsuit, any judgment or settlement will be
paid to him. There is a significant risk that the plaintiff will keep
the money and repudiate his agreement with the investor.
4 1
After a substantial judgment or settlement, the value of the
investor's shares may be three or four times greater than the price
the plaintiff received for them, and, since the agreement is
unenforceable, the plaintiff will have a strong incentive to renege.
In practical terms, then, investing in litigation is not feasible unless
champertous agreements are enforceable. No prudent investor can
assume the risks of doing business without an enforceable agree-
ment. Litigation investment companies, such as Champerco, must
.9. See e.g., McCullar v. Credit Bureau Sys., 832 S.W.2d 886, 887 (Ky. 1992)
(affirming the lower court's denial of the debtor's motion to dismiss against the
champertous assignee after the assignee joined the real creditors as plaintiffs
following the lower courts dismissal, on champerty grounds, of the assignee's action
brought in its own name); see also American Optical v. Curtiss, 59 F.R.D. 644
(S.D.N.Y. 1973), discussed supra note 92.
140 See WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 135, § 1545, at 351-53 ("[W]hen there has
been only a partial assignment the assignor and the assignee each retain an interest
in the claim and are both real parties in interest.").
141 See 14 AM. JUR. 2D Champerty & Maintenance § 15 (1964); see also Parks v.
American Warrior, Inc., 44 F.3d 889, 893 (10th Cir. 1995) (finding that a champer-
tous cost-sharing contract between the plaintiffs and a third party did not operate to
decrease the liability of the defendants to the plaintiffs); American Hotel Management
Assoc. v. Jones, 768 F.2d 562, 570-71 (4th Cir. 1985) (holding that "the champerty
and maintenance doctrine remains viable only as a defense in contract actions");
Killian v. Millard, 228 Cal. App. 3d 1601, 1607 (Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the
defendant, Millard, lacked standing to challenge the contract for sale of shares in the
litigation proceeds). See generally Tellier, supra note 92 (discussing the use of
champerty as a defense).
142 See, e.g., McKellips v. Macintosh, 475 N.W.2d 926, 929 (S.D. 1991) (finding the
agreement champertous and therefore void as against public policy).
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develop a means to enforce their agreements if their business is to
be viable.
IV. CONFLICT OF LAWS
Part III revealed that champerty laws, as ancient and obsolete as
they are, continue to invalidate agreements to divide the proceeds
of litigation. Consequently, almost no state will enforce a champer-
tous agreement. Furthermore, many states will deny standing to a
champertous assignee. This latter consequence is less significant
because a champertous assignee can always sue in the assignor's
name and thereby avoid any champerty challenge to the assignee's
standing. The unenforceability of champertous agreements,
however, makes investing in litigation impracticable. Investors, such
as Champerco, would not be wise to invest in litigation without the
security of an enforceable agreement.
Despite the unenforceability of champertous agreements in
almost every state, champerty laws may not be fatal to investing in
litigation. The contractual nature of champerty laws 143 opens up
the possibility of creating enforceable champertous agreements by
"contracting around" champerty laws.' If Champerco can
somehow choose the law that governs its agreements, then all that
is needed is one state, here New Jersey, to open its doors just a
crack to litigation investment. With the door open, litigation
investment in all other states can get in through that crack. This
Part explores the possibility of contracting around champerty laws
by choosing New Jersey law to govern a champertous agreement.
There are three ways Champerco can "choose" New Jersey law
to govern its agreements: (1) negotiate and execute its agreements
in New Jersey; (2) provide in its agreements that New Jersey law
governs the agreement (that is, a New Jersey choice-of-law clause);
and (3) designate NewJersey as the sole and exclusive forum for any
I's See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONTRACTS § 540(2) (1932) (defining "champerty"
as "the division of the proceeds of litigation between the owner of the litigated claim
and a party supporting or enforcing the litigation"); SAMUEL WILLISTON, A TREATISE
ON THE LAW OF CONTRACTS § 1711, at 857 (Walter H.E. Jaeger ed., 3d ed. 1972)
("Champerty is a bargain to divide the proceeds of a litigation between the owner of
the litigated claim and the party supporting or enforcing the litigation.").
" See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. e (1971) (stating
that the prime objectives of contract law-ensuring certainty and predictability-can
best be obtained by permitting parties to a contract to choose the applicable law
governing the validity of their contract, even though they would be able to escape
prohibitions such as champerty that would otherwise invalidate their agreement).
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litigation arising out of the agreement (that is, a NewJersey forum-
selection clause). Obviously, "choosing" the applicable law is not
that simple: the unfettered ability to contract around a rule of
illegality is an inherently paradoxical concept. 1 45 Not surprisingly,
there are limitations on the ability to contract around a rule of
illegality. 146
In each state, choice-of-law rules determine which state's laws
govern the validity of an agreement and whether the parties' choice
of law will be honored or ignored. Unfortunately, although
predictability and uniformity are two of the key policy goals
underlying the conflict-of-laws field,'47 conflict of laws may very
well be the least predictable and uniform area of the law.
14
Nevertheless, it is fair to say that three basic approaches to conflict
of laws have emerged: the traditional approach (that is, lex loci
contractus in contracts cases), the Restatement (Second) of Conflict
of Laws, and "interest analysis."1 49  Courts, however, frequently
combine these approaches, 5 0 and the approaches themselves
overlap somewhat. This Part cumulatively analyzes Champerco's
145 If parties could freely contract around a rule invalidating their agreement, the
rule would be transformed from a rule of validity to a rule of interpretation. See id.
§ 187 (distinguishing between the parties' ability to choose the law to govern the
interpretation of their agreement and their ability to choose the law governing the
validity of the agreement).
146 See id. (allowing a forum to refuse to follow the parties' choice of law when the
chosen law would contravene a fundamental policy of a state that has a materially
greater interest than the state of the chosen law in the determination of the particular
issue).
147 See id. § 6(2)(f) & cmt. d ("Adoption of the same choice-of-law rules by
many states will further the ... values of certainty, predictability and uniformity of
result.").
118 See ROBERT A. SEDLER, ACROSS STATE LINES 1 (1989) (quoting Professor
Prosser's reference to the conflict-of-laws jurisprudence as a "dismal swamp").
149 Interest analysis was developed by Brainerd Currie. See generally BRAINERD
CURIuE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 183-84 (1963) (arguing that if
a court "finds that the forum state has an interest in the application of [the] policy
[expressed in its laws], it should apply the law of the forum, even though the foreign
state also has an interest in the application of its contrary policy," but that, if the
forum state finds that it has no interest in the application of its policy and that the
foreign state has such an interest, the court should apply the law of the foreign state).
Another modern approach to conflict of laws is the choice-influencing considerations
approach developed by Robert A. Leflar. See generally Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law:
More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54 CAL. L. REV. 1584, 1586 (1966) (outlining
and elaborating the major choice-of-law considerations: (1) predictability of results,
(2) maintenance of interstate and international order, (3) simplification of thejudicial
task, (4) advancement of forum's governmental interests, and (5) application of the
better rule of law).
'50 See SEDLER, supra note 148, at 28.
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agreements under each of the three conflicts approaches and
demonstrates that Champerco can ensure the enforceability of its
agreements by contracting in NewJersey and including NewJersey
choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses in its agreements.
A. Lex Loci Contractus
The traditional approach to determining the law governing the
validity of a contract, which is also the simplest and most predict-
able approach, applies the lex loci contractus, the law of the place of
contracting." The "place of contracting" is the place where the
principal event necessary to form the contract takes place. 52 If
all states followed the traditional approach, then, through the
simple expediency of executing all its contracts in New Jersey,
Champerco could choose NewJersey law to govern its agreements,
ensuring their enforceability and making litigation investment
possible in any state. Few jurisdictions, however, apply the lex loci
contractus rule.15 In fact, New Jersey generally follows the Restate-
ment approach.'5 4 Thus, a champertous agreement executed in
NewJersey would not necessarily be enforced, even by a NewJersey
court.
B. The Restatement and Choice-of-Law Clauses
1. The Restatement's "Contacts" Analysis
The most popular approach to conflict of laws is the Restate-
ment (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Under the Restatement, the
place of contracting is not itself controlling, but is instead one of
several "contacts" evaluated to determine the center of gravity of
the transaction or, as the Restatement calls it, the place with "the
most significant relationship" to the transaction and the parties.
55
The Restatement lists five "contacts" used to determine the place
with the most significant relationship: "(a) the place of contracting,
"5 See id. at 30.
152 See RESTATEMENT (FIRST) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 311-331 (1934).
'l Florida is one jurisdiction that does apply the lex loci contractus rule. See
Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So. 2d 1126, 1128-30 (Fla. 1988).
"5 See State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Estate of Simmons, 417 A.2d 488,491-92
(N.J. 1980) (adopting the Restatement's approach, albeit in slightly modified form, in
insurance contract cases). But see Pfau v. Trent Aluminum Co., 263 A.2d 129, 130-31
(N.J. 1970) (applying the interest analysis approach in a tort case).
"I RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971).
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(b) the place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of perfor-
mance, (d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e)
the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place
of business of the parties."156 Ostensibly, these contacts are
counted up, and the state where the contacts are predominantly
concentrated, if any, is the place with the most significant relation-
ship, or center of gravity.
Under this approach, Champerco can incorporate and establish
its principal place of business in New Jersey, and it can negotiate
and execute all its coritfacts in New Jersey. Unless the location of
the contract's subject matter, the place of performance, and the
residence of the plaintiff are all in another single state, New Jersey
will be 'the state with the most significant relationship, and,
presumably, NewJersey law will apply. This solution, however, falls
short in two respects.
First, the probability that the location of the subject matter of
the contract, the place of performance, and the residence of the
plaintiff are all in one state is not entirely unlikely. The subject
matter of the champertous agreement is the plaintiffs claim, which
is located in the state where it accrues,5 7 very likely the state of
the plaintiffs residence. Furthermore, the forum of the litigation,
which may also be the place of performance of the champertous
agreement,15 8 is also likely to be in the state where the claim
accrues and, thus, also the state of the plaintiffs residence.
Second, although, at first glance, the Restatement appears to
take a relatively simplistic contacts-counting approach, close
examination reveals that the Restatement is quite a bit more
sophisticated. For instance, the Restatement provides that the
contacts should be evaluated according to their relative importance
to the issue.5 9 The Restatement also provides a list of choice-of-
law principles in light of which the contacts are to be evaluated.
160
These principles include, among others, the relevant policies of the
forum, the relevant policies of other interested states and the
relative interest of those states in the determination of the particu-
15 Id.
l See Koro Co. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 568 F. Supp. 280, 286 (D.D.C. 1983).
If the contract designates a particular forum for the underlying action, and
Champerco is required to make some performance in the forum (for example, carry
on the litigation), then the forum is the place of performance.
159 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188(2) (1971).
"6 See id. § 6 (listing factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law
pursuant to § 188).
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lar issue, and the basic policies underlying the particular field of
law.'61 These principles inject too much uncertainty into the
Restatement's approach for Champerco to rely on its aggregation of
New Jersey contacts to ensure the application of New Jersey law to
its agreements.
2. Choice-of-Law Clauses
A much simpler and more obvious solution, provided for in the
Restatement, is for Champerco to designate in its champertous
agreements that New Jersey law governs the agreement. The
Restatement directs the court to follow the parties' choice of law
unless:
application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a
fundamental policy of a state which has a materially greater
interest than the chosen state in the determination of the particu-
lar issue and which, under the rule of§ 188, would be the state of
the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice of law by
the parties.
62
Although choice-of-law clauses essentially give parties the ability to
opt out of a contractual rule of illegality and override the law, the
Restatement contemplates and condones this result within the
prescribed limits. 6 Theoretically, then, Champerco can create
valid champertous agreements, enforceable in every state,"6
simply by designating New Jersey law as the law governing the
agreement. The only requirement is that the application of New
Jersey law will not be contrary to a "fundamental policy" of a state
with a "materially greater interest" in the application of its law to
the determination of the validity of the champertous agreement. 65
The Restatement's "fundamental policy" and "materially greater
interest" test is essentially a modified version of the "interest
analysis" approach, an approach that has not yet been considered.
Therefore, the analysis and discussion of choice-of-law clauses under
16 See id.
1
6 2 Id. § 187(2)(b).
'6 See id. § 187 cmt. e (rejecting traditional ideas that giving the parties to a
contract the power to choose the law governing their agreement is tantamount to
delegating legislative power to them).
"I Although not every state follows the Restatement, the Restatement's approach
to choice-of-law clauses is essentially the only approach. The approach is very
flexible, however, and may be applied with different results by different states. See
infra part IV.F.1.1 See supra note 162 and accompanying text.
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the Restatement will be partially subsumed under and partially
deferred until after the following discussion and application of the
"interest analysis" approach to Champerco's agreements.
C. Interest Analysis
The interest analysis approach resolves choice-of-law problems
by analyzing the interests of the relevant states in the application of
their laws.166  Determining the applicable law under interest
analysis is of great practical significance because, regardless of
whether a court purports to follow the interest analysis approach or
purports to follow some other approach," 7 the interest analysis
approach most accurately predicts which state's law a court will
actually apply. 16' Furthermore, as previously noted, the Restate-
ment's approach to choice-of-law clauses is a modified interest
analysis. Consequently, a thorough application of interest analysis
to Champerco's agreements is necessary to predict whether courts
will enforce such agreements. Additionally, the policy-oriented
nature of interest analysis lends itself as an excellent vehicle for
exploring and critiquing the policies underlying champerty laws.
The fundamental interest analysis rule is that the law of the
forum governs any particular issue unless it is displaced by the law
of another state with a greater interest in the application of its law
to that issue.169 The interest of a state in the application of its law
is determined by the policies reflected in the content of its law, in
light of the state's contacts to the issue. 7 ' In relation to the
contacts-centered approaches, interest analysis differs in that
contacts are significant, not in and of themselves, but only to the
extent that a particular state's policy is affected through that
contact. 171
6 See SEDLER, supra note 148, at 38 ("In considering whether the forum should
displace its own law, the court should first look to the content of the differing laws of
the forum and the other involved state or states. The content of a state's law will
reflect a policy, and the court must determine whether, in light of that policy, one or
more states has an interest in having its law applied ...
167 See id.
'6' See id. at 40 ("[T]he results that the courts reach in the cases coming
before them for decision are generally consistent with the interest analysis
approach.").
169 See id. at 38.
170 See id.
"I See id. at 37-38.
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The most salient feature of interest analysis is that it eliminates
"false conflicts." 72 False conflicts arise when a state has contacts
to a particular issue but has no rel interest in the application of its
law to the determination of that issue. 7 ' A state has an "interest"
if and only if the application of that state's law will actually further
the purposes and policies of the law.'74 If it will not, then that
state's law creates a false conflict, and it will not be applied. The
classic example of a false conflict is the application of a forum's
guest statute to bar a passenger's recovery against a driver for
injuries incurred in an accident in the forum state.' 75 Where both
the driver and passenger are residents of another state, the forum
has no interest in the application of its guest statute, even though
the accident occurred in the forum state. The reason is that the
purposes of the forum's guest statute-to protect its drivers from
ungrateful guests-will not be furthered by the application of the
guest statute to this case, since both the driver and the passenger
are residents of another state.
176
D. Interest Analysis and Champerco
Since there is an apparent conflict between New Jersey law,
under which Champerco's agreements are valid, and the laws of all
other potentially interested states, where such agreements are
invalid, the policies underlying each of these potentially interested
states' laws must be identified and evaluated to determine whether
they create real interests or merely false conflicts. Part III identified
some of the early policies that drove the development of ancient
champerty doctrine. These policies, however, are obsolete, 177 as
some courts have explicitly recognized.' 8 Nevertheless, many
172 Id.
173 See id.
"74See id.; see also Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law-Interest Analysis: They Still Don't Get
It, 40 WAYNE L. REv. 1121, 1137 (1994) ("Whether a state has an 'interest' depends
solely upon whether it is reasonable to conclude that a policy behind that state's
competing law would be advanced if that law were applied.").
"~ For an example of what some have considered to be the paradigm "false
conflict" case, see Babcock v.Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279, 283 (N.Y. 1963).
'76 See SEDLER, supra note 148, at 38.
1" For a discussion of why the policies are obsolete, see supra notes 72-75 and
accompanying text; infra notes 189-91 and accompanying text. See also Radin, supra
note 55, at 66-68 (noting that "the background against which the law of champerty
and maintenance grew up... has disappeared," and "a new basis ha[s] to be found").
171 See, e.g., Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 12 (Or. 1891) ("The doctrine of champerty
... arose from causes peculiar to the state of society in which it was established.").
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courts continue to invoke the common law doctrine against
champerty, offering no insight into its modem policy justifications
and hiding behind conclusory statements that such agreements are
contrary to public policy.
179
Although a court applying interest analysis must give deference
to another state's policy decisions and has no license to discount
another state's policy simply because the court does not approve of
the policy,180 a competing law based on clearly obsolete policies
would be deemed a false conflict because a state has no interest in
the application of its law to further policies it no longer main-
tains.' The challenge to courts applying interest analysis in the
champerty context is to cut through the cobwebs of ancient
champerty doctrine and find the contemporary policies that drove
another state's courts or legislature to preserve the doctrine. The
dearth of authority expounding on the modern policies underlying
champerty laws makes it extremely difficult to conduct an interest
analysis with any integrity. 1 2  However, from the scant sources
that do discuss the modern policy justifications against champerty,
the following policies emerge: the prevention of speculation in
litigation,183 the discouragement of frivolous claims,' and the
See Barrelli v. Levin, 247 N.E.2d 847, 850 (Ind. Ct. App. 1969) ("The public
policy reason for making... champertous contracts void is not always mentioned in
the early cases.").
180 But see RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187 cmt. g (1971)
("The forum will apply its own legal principles in determining whether a given policy
is a fundamental one... and whether the other state has a materially greater interest
than the state of the chosen law in the determination of the particular issue.").
181 See id. (stating that a rule "tending to become obsolete" probably does not
embody a "fundamental policy").
I- See Barrelli, 247 N.E.2d at 850.
"8 See Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 65-66 (1st Cir. 1994) (declaring that 'the
district court hit the bull's-eye when it declared that the 'single, serious purpose' of
[Puerto Rico's champerty statute] is 'to discourage financial speculation in litigation'"
(quoting Pritzker v. Yari, No. CIV.92-2825, 1993 WL 7160, at *5 (D.P.R. Mar. 5,
1993))); Koro Co. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 568 F. Supp. 280,288 (D.D.C. 1983) (declaring
that the purpose of the New York champerty law is "to prevent trafficking and
speculation in lawsuits."); 14 CJ.S. Champerty &9Maintenance § 2 (1991) ("The laws
against champerty... are aimed at the prevention of... speculation in lawsuits.").
18 See Peck v. Heurich, 167 U.S. 624, 630 (1897) (finding that champerty
encourages "baseless litigation"); Barrelli, 247 N.E.2d at 850 ("When the public policy
behind the rule is stated, however, it is usually said that [champertous] contracts tend
to promote litigation and to multiply lawsuits."); Killian v. Millard, 228 Cal. App. 3d
1601, 1604 (Ct. App. 1991) (citing the lower court's finding that champertous
agreements are against public policy because they foment litigation); 14 C.J.S.
Champerty & Maintenance § 2 ("The laws against champerty ... are aimed at the
prevention of multitudinous and useless lawsuits.").
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prevention of harassment, strife, and discord."5 Each of these
policies must be evaluated to determine whether and when it creates
a state interest in the application of its law against champerty or
whether it creates only false conflicts. 6
It is important to bear in mind the context in which a court will
apply interest analysis. The issue of the validity of Champerco's
champertous agreements does not arise in the underlying champer-
tous lawsuit, because Champerco will bring that action in the name
of the real plaintiff-assignor. 7 The issue will only arise after the
plaintiff, acting for or with the help of Champerco, has obtained a
substantial judgment or settlement and then repudiates its agree-
ment with Champerco. When Champerco sues the plaintiff to
enforce the champertous agreement, the plaintiff will raise
champerty as an affirmative defense, claiming that the forum's law,
or some law other than New Jersey's, governs the agreement and
that the agreement is void and unenforceable as illegal or against
public policy under that state's laws. Champerco will counter with
the argument that New Jersey law governs the agreement and that
the agreement is therefore valid and enforceable. The forum will
then look to the policies underlying the potentially applicable
champerty laws to determine whether those laws create false
conflicts or whether the application of those champerty laws would
further their underlying purposes or policies.
1. Speculation in Litigation
The most frequently cited policy underlying champerty laws is
the policy against speculation in litigation.' The goals and
purposes of this policy are far from clear. Under the ancient
common law, speculation in litigation was discouraged as tending to
"8 See Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 270 N.E.2d 691, 693
(N.Y. 1971) (noting that the policy underlying New York's champerty statute is the
prevention of "strife, discord and harassment which could result form permitting
[the] purchase [of] claims for the purpose of bringing actions thereon"); Brown v.
Bigne, 28 P. 11, 13 (Or. 1891) (stating that modern champerty "is confined to cases
where a man, for the purpose of stirring up strife and litigation, encourages others
... to bring actions").
"86 When dealing with choice-of-law clauses under the Restatement, there is
actually another requirement-that the policy be a fundamental one. See RESTATE-
MENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187 (1971).
187 See supra part III.C.
'86 See, e.g., Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 65-66 (1st Cir. 1994); Koro Co. v. Bristol-
Myers Co., 568 F. Supp. 280, 288 (D.D.C. 1983).
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lead to "the abhorred sin of usury."'8 9 This was part of the
common law's effort at frustrating capitalism.19 Usury (that is,
loans on interest) is no longer an "abhorred sin"; in fact, along
with speculation, it is the cornerstone of our modern capitalist
economy.191
Perhaps the modern application of the policy against speculation
in litigation is the paternalistic policy against gambling, an extreme
form of speculation. Although investing in litigation is distinguish-
able from gambling, 9 2 there is support for the proposition, that
the policy is directed against "gambling" on lawsuits. 9 ' If pre-
venting gambling is the policy underlying modern champerty laws,
then, in the context of Champerco, champerty laws only create false
conflicts. Since the gambler, Champerco, is a New Jersey corpora-
tion, New Jersey would be only the state19 4 with a real paternalistic
interest in the application of its law to prevent Champerco from
gambling. The problem, of course, is that NewJersey has no law or
policy against champerty. Since none of the other involved states'
paternalistic policies against gambling would be furthered by the
application of their champerty law to Champerco's agreement, their
champerty laws create only false conflicts.
More likely, however, rather than embodying a paternalistic
desire to protect gamblers from their own improvidence, the policy
against speculation in litigation represents a policy against doubtful
and specdative (that is, frivolous) actions for the purpose of
harassing others and stirring up strife.'95 The most thorough
189 Radin, supra note 55, at 61; see also id. at 69 ("To acquire a share in [] a claim
is essentially a speculation and in the Middle Ages is tainted with the discredit which
attached to every form of speculation.")
" See id. at 65 ("Champerty ... had its source in the resistance to the slowly
growing capitalism that followed the Renaissance of the eleventh and twelfth
centuries.").
'9' See id. at 70.
'9 Whereas gamblers simply pool their monies and then redistribute the monies
to the winners, the winnings from speculation in litigation are not drawn from the
speculators' monies, but from the proceeds of a successful claim. Therefore,
theoretically, there can be an expected net positive gain from investing in litigation,
unlike in gambling, where there is an expected net positive loss.
"' See, e.g., Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 13 (Or. 1891) ("The doctrine of champerty
is directed against speculation in lawsuits, and to repress the gambling propensity of
buying up doubtful claims."); OFFERING CIRCULAR, supra note 11, at 8 (identifying
gambling establishments as potential competitors to investing in litigation).
"94 Champerco's shareholders and investors are in a sense also gamblers, but they
are not directly a party to Champerco's agreements and their impact is too diluted
to create an interest in the application of the state law of the shareholders.
" See 14 C.J.S. Champerty and Maintenance § 3 (1991).
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judicial discussion of the contemporary evils against which
champerty laws are directed is found in the oft-cited case of Brown
v. Bigne.9 6 In Bigne, the court enforced a champertous agree-
ment, distinguishing between "the bona fide acquisition of an
interest in the subject of litigation [and] an unfair or illegitimate
transaction, gotten up for the purpose merely of spoil or specula-
tion."
1 97
The line is not entirely clear, but the court's opinion seems to
indicate that an illegitimate transaction is one entered into for the
purpose of stirring up strife or litigation or harassing others. 19
Some courts have expressly stated that the underlying basis of the
law against champerty and the policy against speculation in
litigation is the tendency of champerty to encourage harassment,
strife, and discord.' 99 The policy against speculation in litigation,
then, is a policy against frivolous claims, and is based on the
concern that speculation in litigation has a tendency to encourage
others "to bring actions.., which they have no right to" bring, "for
the mere purpose or desire of perpetuating strife and litiga-
tion."
200
" 28 P. 11 (Or. 1891).
197 Id. at 13.
19' In at least six different places, the court refers to the illegitimate purposes that
mayjustify the application of champerty laws to invalidate an agreement. The case
is not entirely clear and consistent and, at some points, seems to include speculation
in litigation as an illegitimate purpose distinct from the problems of stirring up strife
and litigation or harassing others. On the whole, the latter two purposes seem to
dominate the court's understanding of the modern policy justifications against
champerty.
'" See e.g., Fairchild Hiller Corp. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 270 N.E.2d 691,
693 (N.Y. 1971) (-The legislative concern is ... [t]o prevent the ... strife, discord
and harassment which could result from permitting attorneys and corporations to
purchase claims for the purpose of bringing actions thereon."); see also Koro Co. v.
Bristol-Myers Co., 568 F. Supp. 280, 288 (D.D.C. 1983) (citing Fairchild and
interpreting New York's policy of preventing strife, discord, and harassment as a
policy against trafficking and speculating in litigation). Although Brown v. Bigne held
that champertous agreements are invalid only when made for an "illegitimate"
purpose (such as stirring up strife), other states that invalidate all champertous
agreements presumably are concerned with the tendency or potential for champerty
to foster these illegitimate purposes. Thus, although the holding in Brown v. Bigne
is directly contrary to the champerty laws of many other states, and, indeed, is often
cited as support for enforcing a champertous agreement, the case nevertheless is an
accurate expression of the modern policies underlying champerty laws. Other states
simply find that these policies justify broader laws against champerty, not limited to
circumstances in which the potential evils of champerty are directly involved.
No Bigne, 28 P. at 13.
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2. Frivolous Claims
Champerty's tendency to encourage frivolous claims is fre-
quently cited as the modern justification for its prohibition.
20
1
The basis for assuming that champerty tends to encourage frivolous
claims has never been examined. Brown v. Bigne20 2 suggests that
the law is concerned that champerty encourages people to bring
claims that they would not otherwise have brought.2°3 This would
mean that the law draws two inferences. First, the law assumes that,
if a plaintiff sells part or all of his claim, he would not otherwise
have brought the claim himself. Second, the law assumes that, if a
plaintiff would not have brought a claim, then the claim is frivolous.
In other words, the two inferences are first, if a claim is meritorious,
the claimant will bring the claim, and second, if a plaintiff is willing
to bring a claim, the plaintiff will not sell all or part of that claim.
Admittedly, the two inferences are weak and have never been
empirically supported. Based on this line of reasoning, however,
many states, by indiscriminantly invalidating all champertous
agreements, maintain an irrebuttable presumption that the claims
underlying these agreements are frivolous.204 Assuming that there
is a rational connection between champerty and frivolous claims,
three states may have an "interest" in the application of their
champerty laws to Champerco's agreements in furtherance of their
policies against frivolous claims: the forum of the enforcement
action (the "enforcement forum"), the forum of the underlying
champertous lawsuit (the "underlying forum"), and the state of the
defendant's residence (the "defendant state").
a. The Enforcement Forum
At first glance, it might appear that when Champerco brings an
action to enforce its champertous agreements, the enforcement
forum has an "interest" in applying its champerty laws to invalidate
the agreement and to dismiss the "champertous" lawsuit. Under its
20! See Peck v. Heurich, 167 U.S. 624, 630 (1897).
22 28 P. 11 (Or. 1891).
203 See id. at 13 (stating that the doctrine of champerty "is confined to cases where
a man.., encourages others.., to bring actions [which they] otherwise would not"
bring); see also Simon, supra note 21, at 11 ("The major arguments against syndicated
lawsuits are [that] syndication stirs up litigation ... that otherwise would never be
brought .... ").
204 But see Bigne, 28 P. at 13 (holding that champertous agreements should not be
held per se void, as they "may sometimes be in furtherance ofjustice").
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champerty law, the forum presumes that "champertous" lawsuits are
frivolous, and frivolous claims waste courts' time and resources,
clogging their dockets. Under interest analysis, however, assuming
that the enforcement forum was not also the underlying forum, the
enforcement forum's champerty laws create only a false conflict
because the forum has no "interest" in the application of its
champerty laws to invalidate Champerco's agreements. More
specifically, the application of the enforcement forum's champerty
law to invalidate Champerco's agreement will not advance the law's
underlying policy against frivolous claims.
Although the enforcement forum may presume that "champer-
tous lawsuits" are frivolous, Champerco's enforcement action is not
a "champertous lawsuit." To the enforcement forum, Champerco's
enforcement action is no different than any other contract enforce-
ment action. The fact that this contract would be illegal and void
under the enforcement forum's champerty laws is irrelevant,
because the enforcement forum's interest in deterring frivolous
claims is not implicated by this contract. Although the law may
presume that a claim supported by or subject to a champertous
agreement is frivolous, there is no reason to assume that a contract
enforcement action is frivolous simply because the contract relates
to a frivolous claim.
To understand the point a bit more clearly, the line of infer-
ences, delineated earlier, that connects champerty and the policy
against frivolous claims must be applied. The law usually assumes
that a plaintiff who is willing to bring a claim will not sell all or part
of the claim. Therefore, if a plaintiff does, in fact, sell part of the
claim, we can infer that, but for the champertous agreement, the
plaintiff would not have brought the claim, and that the claim is
therefore frivolous. This same logic becomes circular when it is
applied to an action to enforce a champertous agreement: The
enforcement action is frivolous because, but for the champertous
agreement, no action to enforce the champertous agreement would
have been brought. If we accept this argument, then all contract-
enforcement actions are frivolous because, but for the making of
the contract, there would be no enforcement action. The fact that
champertous agreements, unlike other contracts, are illegal does not
change the fact that invalidating the agreement, which presumably
promoted a frivolous claim in the underlyingforum, will not further
the enforcement forum's policy against frivolous claims. If any state
has an "interest," it is the underlying forum.
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b. The Underlying Forum
Unlike the policies of the enforcement forum, the underlying
forum's policy against frivolous claims is affected by the under-
lying champertous, and presumably frivolous, lawsuit that takes
place in its courts. Frivolous lawsuits waste limited judicial
resources and clog the courts' dockets, preventing or delaying
access to justice to other plaintiffs with meritorious claims.
Apparently, then, the underlying forum has an interest in the
application of its law by the enforcement forum to invalidate
Champerco's champertous agreement in order to protect its courts
from frivolous claims. 0 5 Nevertheless, the underlying forum's
policy against frivolous claims creates only a doubtful, or at most
marginal, "interest" in the application of its champerty law by the
enforcement forum.
i. An "Interest" Based on a Legal Fiction
One problem with the underlying forum's purported "interest"
is that, although the underlying forum may have presumed that the
underlying champertous lawsuit was frivolous, the enforcement
forum-which has the benefit of hindsight-can see that the underly-
ing lawsuit was not in fact frivolous. When a plaintiff obtains a
recovery that is substantial enough for the plaintiff to repudiate its
champertous agreement and substantial enough for Champerco to
bring an enforcement action, the facts militate strongly against the
legal presumption that the claim was frivolous. Furthermore, if the
underlying claim was- frivolous, then the underlying forum itself
should have vindicated its own policy against frivolous claims
through dismissal, sanctions, or summary judgment.2 6 Certainly,
if the underlying forum actually rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, the presumption of frivolousness is rebutted. Legal
fictions do not create real "interests." The underlying forum's
"interest" in weeding out frivolous claims will not be advanced by
invalidating an agreement that promoted a manifestly meritorious
05 See Pritzker v. Yari, 42 F.3d 53, 62-64 (1st Cir. 1994) (emphasizing, in the
context of a "minimum contacts" analysis, the underlying forum's interest).
2  See Brame v. Ray Bills Fin. Corp., 85 F.R.D. 568, 578 n.6 (N.D.N.Y 1979)
(stating that "[iut is questionable whether [the fear that champerty will result in a
greater number of vexatious or frivolous lawsuits]... is a sufficientjustification for
the prohibition on [champerty], in view of the existence of other safeguards against
frivolous litigation, such as summary judgment").
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claim, regardless of the underlying forum's presumption that the
claim was frivolous. The underlying forum's "interest," therefore,
is highly questionable.
ii. Deterrence and Open Courts
Despite the fact that it might be apparent, with the benefit of
hindsight, that Champerco's underlying lawsuit was not frivolous,
the underlying forum may nevertheless have a general deterrence
interest in the application of its champerty law to invalidate
Champerco's agreement in order to discourage future champertous
lawsuits, which the underlying forum presumes are frivolous.
Finding that the underlying forum has a deterrence "interest" in the
application of its champerty law assumes that invalidating a
champertous agreement that promoted a meritorious claim will
further the policies of the underlying forum's champerty law. This
assumption, however, is seriously flawed.
Some measure of deterrence against frivolous claims will likely
be achieved by invalidating a champertous agreement that promotes
a meritorious claim. However, when the true nature of the policy
against frivolous claims and champerty is considered, the small
measure of deterrence achieved appears insignificant in light of the
countervailing adverse effects on the underlying forum's "open
courts" policy.
(a) Dual Policies
Rules against frivolous claims represent a balance between two
competing policies: (1) providing all meritorious claimants their day
in court (the "open courts" policy) and (2) eliminating all claims
that have no merit (that is, frivolous claims).0 7 In designing
sanctions rules against frivolous claims, legislatures and courts seek
to balance these two policies.
20 8
Because frivolous claims must be eliminated, if at all, at an early
stage of litigation, these rules must establish a threshold which
claims must meet before they are heard.0 9 Inevitably, because
2o7 See Byron C. Keeling, Toward a Balanced Approach to "Frivolous" Litigation: A
Critical Review of Federal Rule 11 and State Sanctions Provisions, 21 PEPP. L. REV. 1067,
1152 (1994) (stating that "a sanctions scheme must respect both the interest in
preserving free access to the courts and the interest in redressing litigation abuse").
m See id.
29 See id. at 1094-1125 (discussing three approaches to drawing the line between
frivolous and nonfrivolous claims in sanctions provisions).
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claims will be evaluated before they are fully heard, some meritori-
ous claims will fall short of the threshold and will be denied their
day in court, and some meritless claims will nevertheless meet the
threshold and will be fully heard. The point is that the line,
wherever drawn, does not separate the meritorious claims from the
meritless claims, but represents a dividing point on a slippery slope.
On the average, claims falling below the line will be frivolous.
210
With regard to these claims, the open courts policy is subordinated
to the policy against frivolous claims, and these claims will be
dismissed and discouraged. Claims rising above the line, on the
average, will be meritorious. With regard to these claims, the policy
against frivolous claims is subordinated to the open courts policy,
and these claims are permitted and encouraged.
Champerty laws represent a line that states draw in the imple-
mentation of their policies against frivolous claims. These laws do
not presume that all champertous agreements promote frivolous
claims and are therefore against public policy. The law recognizes,
as illustrated in Part I, that champertous agreements often promote
access to the courts by meritorious claimants who cannot otherwise
afford to bring their claims or who prefer to avoid the risk, hassle,
and delay of litigation. 2 11 Champerty laws simply presume that,
on the average, champertous agreements promote frivolous claims.
The open courts policy is therefore subordinated to the policy
against frivolous claims, and champertous agreements are prohi-
bited.
The pertinent point is that the open courts policy is subordinated
by champerty laws, but not eliminated. 21 2 The fact that it is the
210 This does not mean that a majority of the claims falling below the threshold
will be frivolous, but rather that the benefit of the frivolous claims excluded
outweighs the harm of the meritorious claims excluded.
21 See Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 13 (Or. 1891) ("Indeed, it may sometimes be in
furtherance ofjustice and right that a suitor who has ajust title to property, and no
means except the property itself, should be assisted [by a] fair bonafide agreement...
to supply funds to carry on [the] pending suit, in consideration of having a share in
the property if recovered... ."); 14 AM.JUR. 2D Champerty &Maintenance § 1 (1964)
("[T]o transfer a right of action or to maintain the suit of another ... will by no
means necessarily produce mischief or oppression.... [S]uch... maintenance will
have a tendency to secure rights and promote the ends ofjustice.").
2" This is evidenced by the fact that in some states champerty laws invalidate
champertous agreements only when the agreements are against "public policy" or
entered into for "illegitimate" purposes. Connecticut, for example, has taken a public
policy approach. See Rice v. Farrell, 28 A.2d 7, 8 (Conn. 1942) ("[T]he only test is
whether a particular transaction is against public policy."). Alabama and Oregon have
taken a "legitimate purpose" approach. See Bigne, 28 P. at 13 (holding that
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policy against frivolous claims that is evinced by the champerty law
should not mask the existence of a subordinate policy which may
become dominant in particular cases. When it is clear that the
underlying claim was not frivolous, then the underlying forum's
policy against frivolous claims is subordinated to its open courts
policy, and the underlying forum has no "interest" in the applica-
tion of its champerty law by the enforcement forum to invalidate
the agreement. The fact that Champerco's champertous agreement
would be illegal under the underlying forum's champerty law does
not necessarily translate into an "interest" by the underlying state
in the application of its law. The beauty of interest analysis is that,
although the underlying forum would apply its law indiscriminately,
regardless of which policy dominates in a particular case, the
enforcement forum is not constrained by the underlying forum's
law, and need only apply the underlying forum's champerty law
when the underlying forum has an "interest" in its application, that
champertous agreements must be carefully scrutinized to determine whether they
were made with the "bonafide object of assisting a claim believed to be just [or] for
the [illegitimate] purpose of injury and oppressing others by aiding unrighteous
suits"); Lott v. Kees, 165 So. 2d 106, 108-11 (Ala. 1964) (adopting the Bigne
approach).
New York has drawn a bright-line rule against champerty, but has carved out an
exception for one class of plaintiffs whose legitimate purpose in selling their claims
is readily apparent. See N.Y.JUD. LAW § 489 (McKinney 1983) (allowing the purchase
of claims from bankruptcy trustees and other receivers who are in charge of winding
up estates so as to "facilitate" the expeditious liquidation of these estates); People v.
Berlin, 317 N.Y.S.2d 191, 193 (Nassau County Ct. 1971) (discussing the facilitation
of expeditious liquidation and final settlement of certain estates); see also supra note
88 (elaborating on this exception). New York's exception further illustrates that in
champertylaws, the "open courts" policy is merely subordinated to the policy against
frivolous claims. In fact, every state, by permitting contingent fee agreements, which
are a form of champerty, has decided that in some circumstances the open courts
policy should prevail over the policy against frivolous claims. See Richette v. Solomon
187 A.2d 910, 918 (Pa. 1963) ("Contingent fees ... enable some just claims to be
recovered which the circumstances of the parties would otherwise defeat, while on the
other hand they certainly tend to encourage litigation of a speculative and unfounded
character, which is against the true interests of society. But wisely or unwisely, a
point on which opinions may fairly differ, the law has long been settled that contracts
'for such fees are lawful and enforceable by the courts and something more than the
mere contingency of the compensation is necessarj to make them [illegal].' (quoting Williams
v. Philadelphia, 57 A. 578, 579 (Pa. 1904))).
Conversely, New Jersey, in which the "open courts" policy has prevailed and
champerty is legal, has a strong public policy against frivolous claims. See NJ. STAT.
ANN. § 2A:15-59.1(a), (b) (West Supp. 1995) (defining a "frivolous" claim as a claim
that "was commenced, used or continued in bad faith, solely for the purpose of
harassment, delay or malicious injury").
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is, when the policy against frivolous claims is dominant and the
open courts policy is subordinate.
(b) The Ultimate Policy
More than just a subordinate policy, the open courts policy is
actually the ultimate policy underlying champerty laws and the
policy against frivolous claims. From the underlying forum's
perspective, frivolous claims waste limited judicial resources, clog
the courts' dockets, and prevent or delay meritorious claimants
from having their day in court.2 13 The ultimate harm, then, of
frivolous claims is that they impede the forum's open courts policy.
Thus, eliminating frivolous claims is actually a means of effectuating
the underlying forum's open courts policy of promoting free access
to the courts for the just, speedy, and inexpensive resolution of
legitimate claims, 2 14 and the ultimate policy goal of champerty
laws is to promote free access to courts.
Therefore, when a champertous agreement furthers the
underlying forum's open courts policy and enables the underlying
plaintiff to bring her meritorious claim, the underlying forum can
hardly have an "interest" in the application of its champerty law to
invalidate the agreement. Invalidating the agreement will not
further the underlying forum's ultimate champerty policy of
promoting access to its courts. On the contrary, enforcing
Champerco's agreement will encourage other similar agreements
that will promote access to the courts for "blue collar plaintiffs" and
enable other plaintiffs to receive prompt and certain recoveries.
Ultimately, then, the small additional deterrence against
frivolous claims achieved by invalidating meritorious champertous
agreements, such as Champerco's, will not further the policy against
frivolous claims and ensure free access as much as enforcing such
agreements will. Therefore, the underlying forum has no "interest"
in the application of its champerty law to invalidate meritorious
champertous agreements, such as Champerco's. The underlying
forum's champerty law creates only a false conflict, or at best a weak
interest, that is not "materially greater" than the interest of New
Jersey in the application of its law.
2 15
212 See Keeling, supra note 207, at 1069 (stating that "[frivolous] litigation that
serves no function other than to consume court time" must be eliminated).
214 See FED. R. Civ. P. 1 (instructing that the Federal Rules, which in large part
seek to eliminate frivolous claims, should "be construed and administered to secure
the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action").
2" For a discussion of NewJersey's interest, see infra part IV.D.3. For a discussion
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iii. Is Hindsight 20/20?
Hindsight is the factor that allows the enforcement forum to
promote the interests of the underlying forum and yet reach a
different result than the underlying forum would have reached.
Since frivolous claims must be weeded out, if at all, before they
consume the court's time, the underlying forum is forced to adopt
a bright-line rule invalidating all champertous agreements, without
seeking to determine whether a particular champertous agreement
in fact promotes a frivolous claim. The enforcement forum, on the
other hand, passes on the validity of the champertous agreement
after the underlying claim has been fully heard and disposed of. It
has the opportunity to see, with hindsight, whether or not the
champertous agreement actually promoted a frivolous claim and,
therefore, whether or not to apply the underlying forum's cham-
perty law.
Another problem, however, presents itself at this point. If the
mere existence of an enforcement action is enough to rebut the
underlying forum's presumption that the claim was frivolous, then
champertous agreements will always be enforced. Only meritorious
claims result in enforcement actions, since frivolous claims, by
definition, yield no recovery and, therefore, no opportunity for the
plaintiff to breach a champertous agreement. The problem, then,
is that narrowing the application of the underlying forum's
champerty law to truly frivolous claims will fail to effectuate the
law's underlying policy of deterring frivolous claims. Champertors
will be in a no-lose situation: If the underlying claim results in no
recovery, the champertor will have no need to enforce his champer-
tous agreement, and if the underlying claim does result in a
recovery, the fact of recovery will be enough to rebut the presump-
tion of frivolousness and enforce the agreement.
216
To resolve the foregoing problem, it is necessary to examine
more thoroughly the interaction between frivolous claims and
of the Restatement's "materially greater interest" test, see infra part IV.E.
216 Because narrowing the application of the underlying forum's champertylaw to
frivolous claims will not effectuate the law's purposes, the underlying forum will have
an "interest" in the application of its champerty law even to meritorious claims. The
underlying forum, by virtue of its law against champerty, has implicitly decided that,
in an all-or-nothing situation, enforcing no champertous agreements will further its
policies more than enforcing all champertous agreements because the law presumes
that, on the average, champertous agreements tend to promote frivolous claims. See
supra notes 208-11 and accompanying text.
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champerty laws. In reality, the foregoing problem presents itself
irrespective of any of the arguments set forth in this Comment.
Champerty laws seek to deter frivolous claims by eliminating the
economic incentives to promote frivolous claims, that is, by denying
champertors their share of the litigation proceeds. But, if frivolous
claims never yield any proceeds, how can frivolous claims ever be
deterred by denying champertors their share in the proceeds? More
pointedly, why would a champertor ever invest in a frivolous claim?
And why would the law presume that a claim is frivolous because
someone contracted for a share of the proceeds?
Obviously, the assumption that frivolous claims never yield any
recovery is false. Frivolous claims often yield nuisance settlements,
which represent nothing more than the nuisance value of the suit-
the expense, harassment, and embarrassment that the defendant
may endure in defending the suit. These nuisance settlements
provide enough of an incentive for plaintiffs to pursue them
217
and, therefore, for investors to invest in them.
Champerty laws deter such investors by invalidating champer-
tous agreements, eliminating the economic incentive to promote
these frivolous claims for their nuisance value. To be effective,
then, champerty laws need not invalidate all agreements, but only
those that promote frivolous claims brought solely for their
nuisance value. This narrow application of the underlying forum's
champerty law will effectively deter frivolous claims by eliminating
the economic incentive-the nuisance settlement-to invest in and
promote such claims.
One question remains: How will the enforcement forum
determine whether the plaintiff's recovery is a nuisance settle-
ment and the claim is frivolous, or whether the recovery is real
and the claim meritorious? To this point, the analysis has
proceeded on the assumption that the mere existence of an
enforcement action is sufficient to rebut the presumption that
217 See COOTER & ULEN, supra note 25, at 486 (stating that "nuisance suits are
possible between rational plaintiffs and defendants only when a trial is more costly to
the latter than the former"); Lucian A. Bebchuk, Suing Solely to Extract a
Settlement Offer, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 437, 448 (1988) ("Because defendants might be
uncertain whether the expected value to the plaintiff of going to trial is negative or
positive, a defendant might make a settlement offer to a plaintiff ... ."); D.
Rosenberg & S. Shavell, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought for Their Nuisance Value,
5 INT'L REV. L. & EcON. 3, 3 (1985) (arguing that a "defendant should be willing to
pay a positive amount in settlement to the plaintiff with the weak case-despite the
defendant's knowledge that were he to defend himself, such a plaintiff would
withdraw").
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the underlying champertous lawsuit was frivolous. That assumption,
however, is no longer true, as a claim may be frivolous and yet
yield a nuisance recovery followed by a breach and an enforcement
action.
When the underlying forum renders judgment in favor of the
plaintiff, the enforcement forum should have no problem finding
that the underlying claim was not frivolous. The issue will only arise
when the underlying claim results in a settlement. The enforcement
forum will have to make its determination based on the totality of
the evidence available, including the evidence presented or
discovered at the trial level, the results of any dispositive motions,
the absolute size of the settlement, its relationship to the plaintiffs
claim,218 and its relationship to the defendant's expected costs of
litigation. Although there is no precise formula, the reality is that
trial courts are constantly forced to make such determinations about
a claim's merit in response to motions for dismissal, sanctions, and
summary judgment-without the benefit of fully hearing the claim.
The enforcement forum, therefore, with the aid of hindsight and a
fully developed record, should be able to separate the nuisance
settlements from the legitimate settlements, or the frivolous claims
from the meritorious claims.
The fact that in some instances it will be close to impossible
to make a determination whether a settlement was a nuisance
settlement or whether a claim was meritorious, should not pre-
vent the enforcement forum from making this determination in
cases where the totality of the evidence clearly supports a find-
ing one way or another. Instead, when the enforcement forum
is uncertain, it should find: (1) that the underlying forum's
presumption that the champertous lawsuit was frivolous is not
rebutted; (2) that the application of the underlying forum's
champerty law to invalidate the champertous agreement would
deter other frivolous claims in the underlying forum and further
the underlying forum's champerty law's policy against frivolous
claims; (3) that the underlying forum therefore has an "interest"
in the application of its champerty law by the enforcement forum;
(4) that, in the absence of any competing "interest," the
underlying forum's champerty law should apply; and (5) that the
champertous agreement is illegal and unenforceable. If, on the
218 See 52 AM. JUR. 2D Malicious Prosecution § 163 (1970) (noting that the size of
the settlement relative to the requested damages may nullify any presumption of
probable cause that the settlement may have otherwise carried).
1996] 1577
1578 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1529
other hand, the enforcement forum finds that the settlement was
not a nuisance settlement, it should find: (1) that the underlying
claim was not frivolous; (2) that the enforcement of the champer-
tous agreement would promote access to courts by other meritori-
ous claimants; (3) that the underlying forum's champerty law's
policy against frivolous claims is, therefore, subordinated to its open
courts policy; (4) that the enforcement of the agreement would
further the underlying forum's champerty law's ultimate policy
goals; (5) that the underlying forum has no "interest" in the
application of its champerty law to invalidate the champertous
agreement; and (6) that the underlying forum's champerty law,
therefore, does not apply.
c. The Defendant State and Harassment
The defendant state has an interest in preventing harass-
ment, strife, and discord to its residents. This interest,
however, is merely the flip side of a forum's interest in deterring
frivolous claims. Frivolous claims force defendants to bear the
annoyance and cost of defending themselves against baseless
litigation, and a state, therefore, has an interest in protecting its
residents from frivolous claims. A state, on the other hand, has no
legitimate interest in protecting its residents from meritorious
claims.
Essentially, then, the policy of discouraging frivolous claims and
the policy of preventing harassment, strife, and discord are simply
two distinct states' interests against frivolous claims: an enforce-
ment forum's interest in providing access to its courts and a
defendant state's interest in protecting defendants from harassment.
Noting this, the above discussion pertaining to the underlying
forum's interests is equally applicable to the defendant state. In
pertinent part, if the underlying forum's policy against frivolous
claims is effectuated, the underlying defendant state has no distinct
interest in the application of its champerty law. When the enforce-
ment forum determines that the underlying claim may have been
frivolous, it will follow the interests of both the underlying forum
and the defendant state in the application of their champerty laws.
When, however, the enforcement forum determines that the
underlying claim was not frivolous, neither the underlying forum
nor the defendant state will have a real interest in the application
of their champerty laws.
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3. Policies Favoring Champerty
Although New Jersey's permissive law on champerty might be
characterized as passive and neutral, representing no affirmative
policy choices, this mischaracterizes New Jersey's interest in the
application of its law.219 At a minimum, New Jersey has an inter-
est in the enforcement of all contracts made in NewJersey, whether
for the sale of goods, the sale of shares in a company, or the sale of
shares in a lawsuit.22° The fact that there is no specific policy for
the enforcement of champertous agreements221 does not mean
that New Jersey has no interest in the application of its general
contract law to enforce a champertous agreement made in New
Jersey by a New Jersey corporation.
In addition to NewJersey's general policy of enforcing contracts,
there are affirmative policy reasons for enforcing champertous
agreements, although NewJersey courts have never expressed them.
One such policy is New Jersey's "open courts" policy,2 22 a strong
constitutional policy of providing access to the courts for all liti-
gants.223 Champertous agreements further this open courts policy
by allowing litigants who cannot bear the costs of litigation to offer
219 See infra notes 237-48 and accompanying text (discussing Koro Co. v. Bristol-
Myers, Co., 568 F. Supp. 280, 286-87 (D.D.C. 1983), in which the court relied on this
mistaken assumption to apply New York instead of New Jersey law).
'o See Saxon Constr. & Management Corp. v. Masterclean of North Carolina, Inc.,
641 A.2d 1129, 1131 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1992) ("[It has long been the law that
the principle of freedom of contract permits competent parties to make ...
agreements as they wish unless the agreement violates public policy ... ."). See
generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS 9 (2d ed. 1990) (describing the function
of contract law as "furthering the general economic good by encouraging parties to
enter into such productive transactions").
22 But see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:25-1 (West 1987) (specifically allowing assignment
of any contract claim).
' See Susan L. Martin, Syndicated Lawsuits: Illegal Champerty or New Business
Opportunity?, 30 AM. Bus. LJ. 485, 486 (1992) ("American policy favoring wide open
court doors supports the syndication of lawsuits in certain circumstances and the
continued erosion of a champerty defense."); Simon, supra note 21, at 11
("[S]yndication helps claim holders raise sufficient funds to see their claims
through."); Abraham,supra note 52, at 1298-99 (pointing out a contradiction in states
that maintain champerty laws while purporting to maintain "open courts" policies);
Cox, supra note 13, at 154 (suggesting that "lawsuit syndication can enhance the
efficacy of ourjudicial system by assuring meritorious claim holders adequate means
of adjudicating their claims").
22 This is actually a constitutional right in NewJersey. See State ex rel. D.H., 353
A.2d 570, 572 (N.J. Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1976) (holding that "though the right of
access to the courts is not specifically guaranteed by the NewJersey Constitution, it
is a natural and inalienable right derived from Article 1").
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shares in their claims in exchange for funds or an agreement to
finance their lawsuits. Similar to its policy of providing open courts
to all litigants, New Jersey has an interest in the availability of legal
redress for all wrongs against New Jersey residents, even in other
states. Champerty may further this interest as well. In addition,
New Jersey may have an interest in the prompt recovery of
compensation and redress for legal wrongs.2 24 Champerty allows
a plaintiff to sell her claim for an immediate recovery.
In general, however, only New Jersey's policy of enforcing all
contracts made in New Jersey will be furthered by the application
of New Jersey's law and the enforcement of Champerco's agree-
ments.225 Its open courts policies are not implicated unless either
the underlying champertous lawsuit is in NewJersey or the plaintiff
in the underlying lawsuit is a New Jersey resident.
4. Summary of Interest Analysis
Three possible modern policies underlying champerty laws have
been identified: (1) preventing speculation in litigation, (2)
deterring frivolous claims, and (3) preventing harassment, strife, and
discord.
Preventing speculation in litigation, to the extent this policy
represents a paternalistic policy against gambling, creates only a
false conflict, as the gambler, Champerco, is a New Jersey corpora-
tion, and Champerco's agreements are enforceable under New
Jersey law. To the extent that the policy of preventing speculation
in litigation represents a policy of deterring frivolous claims
believed to result from speculation in litigation, the policy creates
a doubtful deference interest, if any, in the application of the
underlying forum's champerty law. Assuming that Champerco can
demonstrate that the underlying claim was patently nonfrivolous,
the underlying forum's "interest" is dubious because the policies
underlying this champerty law will be furthered more by not having
its champerty law applied than by having it applied. Whether the
" See, e.g., supra note 88 (discussing New York's policy of facilitating prompt
recovery for a certain class of plaintiffs).
" The interest of the "place of contracting" is obvious from the great weight the
Restatement gives, and the dispositive weight the traditional approach gives, to the
place of contracting. This interest also finds support in some of the Restatement's
choice-of-law principles, including the protection of the parties' "justified expecta-
tion," the "basic policies underlying [contract] law," "predictability... of result," and
"ease in the determination and application of the law." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2)(d)-(g) (1971).
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underlying forum's open courts policy and frivolous claims policy
are viewed as dual conflicting policies or as two means to achieve
one ultimate policy goal, the balance of these two policies favors the
enforcement of Champerco's agreement when the underlying claim
was clearly not frivolous and the agreement helped the plaintiff have
his day in court.
The policy of preventing harassment, strife, and discord is
simply the interest of the defendant state in protecting its constitu-
ents from frivolous claims, and as such, creates no distinct state
interest other than the underlying forum's interest in eliminating
frivolous claims.
On the other side of the coin, two possible policies underlying
New Jersey's law permitting champerty were identified: (1) the
general policy of enforcing contracts, and (2) the policy of providing
open courts. While the second policy conflict creates only a false
conflict in most situations, the first policy creates a real "interest."
Although the underlying forum's policy against frivolous claims
and the defendant state's policy of preventing harassment create
only dubious state "interests," these interests may be sufficient to
rise above the level of a false conflict. Therefore, there may be a
true conflict between NewJersey law and the champerty laws of the
underlying forum and defendant state. There is no accord among
the commentators as to how to resolve a true conflict under interest
analysis.226  We need not concern ourselves, however, with the
proper approach, since we deal here with a choice-of-law clause, and
the Restatement's approach is essentially the only one.
E. The Restatement Revisited
Under the Restatement, the parties' choice of law will be applied
unless its application will contravene a fundamental policy of a state
with a materially greater interest that would be the state of
applicable law in the absence of an express choice of law.
227
m Brainerd Currie suggested that the forum should apply its own law. Robert
Leflar has suggested applying the better law. For a discussion of Currie's and Leflar's
views, see supra note 149.
See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF-CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187(2)(b); see also supra
part IV.B.2 (discussing the choice-of-law clauses under the Restatement). There is an
additional exception to the application of the parties' choice of law where "the chosen
state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the transaction and there is no
other reasonable basis for the parties choice." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS § 187(2)(a). This exception poses no obstacle for Champerco as Champerco
is a New Jersey company and its champertous agreements are negotiated and
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1. Fundamental Policy
When is a policy "fundamental?" The comments to the
Restatement say that a fundamental policy is not "likely to
be represented by a rule tending to become obsolete." 228 Since
champerty laws are "tending to become obsolete," 229 their
underlying policies are most probably not "fundamental." Another
"important consideration [to determine whether a state's policy is
fundamental] is the extent to which the significant contacts are
grouped in [that] state .... [and] the extent to which the
significant contacts are grouped in the state of the chosen law."
2
11
The contacts to Champerco's agreements will generally be clus-
tered in New Jersey, including the place of negotiation, the place
of contracting, and the place of incorporation and offices of
Champerco. The grouping of the contacts, therefore, is a strong
indication that the policies underlying the relevant states'
champerty laws are not "fundamental." In fact, as discussed
above, on a pure contacts-counting basis, New Jersey would
generally be the place with the "most significant relationship"
to Champerco's agreements. 23 ' Thus, there is good reason to
doubt that any of the relevant states' champerty policies are
"fundamental."
2. Materially Greater Interest
Regardless of whether or not any of the relevant states'
champerty policies are "fundamental" or whether they create true
conflicts, those states would not have a "materially greater interest"
than New Jersey in the application of their champerty laws to
Champerco's agreements. The interest analysis set forth previously
yielded only two possible states with an "interest" in the application
of their champerty laws: the underlying forum and the defendant
state. Neither of these states, however, has a "materially greater
interest" than NewJersey.
executed in New Jersey.
22
8 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g.
' Brown v. Bigne, 28 P. 11, 13 (Or. 1891) ("In some of the states the whole
doctrine is regarded as entirely obsolete."); 14 AM.JUR. 2D Champery &9Maintenance
§ 1 (1964) ("In many states [the doctrines of champerty and maintenance] are
declared to be obsolete and to have no existence at all.").
230 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 187 cmt. g.
2s See supra part IV.B.1.
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Our interest analysis uncovered serious weaknesses in the
underlying forum's deterrence interest in the application of
its champerty law to Champerco's agreements. Where it is
apparent, albeit with hindsight, that the underlying claim was in
fact not frivolous and the champertous agreement actually enabled
a meritorious claimant to vindicate her claims, the open courts
policy underlying champerty laws favors enforcement of the
agreement. In fact, the enforcement of such champertous agree-
ments would actually further the underlying forum's policy
against frivolous claims by furthering that policy's ultimate pur-
pose of ensuring access to courts for meritorious claimants.
Therefore, the underlying forum's interest in the application of
its champerty law to invalidate Champerco's agreement is relatively
weak.
2 32
For the same reasons, the defendant state has only a weak
interest in the application of its champerty law. The defendant state
has an interest in protecting its residents from frivolous claims only,
not from legitimate claims. Thus, the defendant state has an
interest in the application of its law only to the extent that invalidat-
ing the agreement will further the underlying forum's policy against
frivolous claims.
On the other hand, New Jersey's interest in the application of
its contract law to enforce Champerco's agreements is relatively
strong. New Jersey has an interest in protecting the expecta-
tions of a New Jersey corporation when those expectations are
based on an agreement made in New Jersey and valid under New
Jersey law. Were it not for the fact that such agreements were
disapproved by other states, New Jersey's interest in the applica-
tion of its law to enforce the agreements would be indisputable.
Therefore, neither the interest of the underlying forum nor that of
the defendant state is "materially greater" than New Jersey's
interest.
In conclusion, under the Restatement, Champerco's NewJersey
choice-of-law clauses should be enforced, NewJersey law should be
applied, and Champerco's champertous agreements should be
enforced.
22 Its interest is weak even though the underlying forum itself would not conduct
a policy analysis and would indiscriminately apply its champerty law.
1583
1584 UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 144: 1529
F. The Forum
1. Subjective Interest Analysis
While, objectively, the Restatement's choice-of-law clause
analysis, and its built-in interest analysis, dictate the enforcement of
Champerco's agreements, the reality is that a forum's interest
analysis is likely to be neither correct nor objective. 233 First,
interest analysis is complex and confusing. Courts cannot truly be
expected to conduct anything more than a superficial interest
analysis, and certainly not the thorough analysis of the preceding
section.23 4 Second, the process of determining and evaluating the
policies and purposes of competing laws is too subjective to predict
reliably the results courts will reach. When a court is required to
weigh another state's policies against its own conflicting policies, it
is not difficult to imagine a court failing to give the proper
deference and respect to the other state's policies. Furthermore,
the malleability of interest analysis makes it vulnerable to result-
seeking courts. 235  Champerco cannot rely solely on choice-of-law
clauses and the Restatement's interest analysis to constrain courts
to reach results they prefer not to reach.
2 36
Koro Co. v. Bristol-Myers Co., 2 7 one of the only champerty
choice-of-law cases, is an excellent illustration of the misapplication
of interest analysis and the misunderstanding of the competing
policies. In Koro, the validity of a champertous agreement was at
issue. The result turned on whether New York or New Jersey law
governed the agreement. 238 The District Court for the District of
Columbia began by applying the Restatement's "contacts" analysis
to the agreement to determine the center of gravity.23 9 Interest-
23 See SEDLER, supra note 148, at 74 ("When the forum would be applying its own
invalidating rule in the absence of an express choice, it usually will not recognize that
choice, and contrary to the approach of the Restatement Second, it will not consider
whether the policy involved in its invalidating rule is 'fundamental' as opposed to
being 'strong.'").
' See Posnak, supra note 174, at 1170 (discussing the difficulty some of the
nation's top jurists have had with interest analysis).
25 See infra notes 237-48 and accompanying text.
236 See SEDLER, supra note 148, at 73-74 ("Looking to the results of the decided
cases, it is fair to say that in practice an express choice of law usually will not be
recognized where the matter in issue involves astrongpolcy of the forum or the state
whose law the forum would be applying in the absence of an express choice.").
2 568 F. Supp. 280 (D.D.C. 1983).
238 See id. at 286.
29 Id.
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ingly, this analysis was inappropriate in light of the express New
York choice-of-law clause in the agreement.2 40  The court then
analyzed New York's and New Jersey's competing policies on
champerty and weighed their relative interests in the application of
their laws to the determination of the validity of the champertous
agreement:
241
Here, New York has a clearly enunciated public policy against
champerty, in the form of§ 489 of theJudiciary Law, whereas New
Jersey has no stated policy against champerty, but it no longer
recognizes the doctrine. In such a situation, New York clearly has
the stronger interest in the enforcement of its policy. Application
of New York law would frustrate no New Jersey policy, whereas
application of New Jersey law would certainly impair the purpose
underlying the New York statute, namely the prevention of
trafficking in litigation claims.
2 42
Although the Koro court correctly concluded that New York law
applied and invalidated the agreement,243 its interest analysis was
entirely superficial and flawed. First, the court made no effort to
determine the true nature of the policies underlying New York's
champerty statute. The court's recitation of New York's policy of
"prevent[ing] trafficking in litigation claims" adds little color to the
policies behind New York's champerty statute. 44 Consequently,
the court failed properly to consider whether New York really had
an "interest" in the application of New York's champerty law, that
is, whether it would further the purposes and policies of the law.
The Koro court made no attempt to explain why the "application of
New Jersey law would certainly impair the purpose underlying the
240 The court should have applied the "fundamental policy" test of § 187 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. Under § 187, § 188's most significant
relationship test only becomes relevant once the court determines that the application
of the parties' choice of law would violate the fundamental policy test. It is possible,
however, that the court ignored the parties' choice of New York law, since the
agreement was clearly champertous and invalid under New York law and the parties
obviously did not intend for their agreement to be invalid. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAws § 187 cmt. e (1971) ("If the parties have chosen a law
that would invalidate the contract, it can be assumed that they did so by mistake.").
14' This was done under § 6(2)(c) of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws,
made relevant under § 188(2) in evaluating the contacts listed in § 188(2)(a)-(e).2
1 Koro, 568 F. Supp. at 286-87.
20 The agreement contained a New York choice-of-law clause, and the contacts
were heavily concentrated in New York. See id. at 286.
244 For a critical analysis of the policy against speculation in litigation, see supra
part IV.D.1.
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New York statute."245 Second, the court incorrectly assumed that
NewJersey's passive stance on champerty somehow meant that New
Jersey had no interest in the enforcement of the agreement. The
Koro court's lack of deference to New Jersey's policies is not
surprising, in light of the fact that champerty is illegal in the District
of Columbia.
246
A thorough interest analysis would have revealed that New
Jersey did have an interest in the application of its law, and,
contrary to the court's holding, New York had no interest in the
application of its law. The original plaintiff's business was located
in New Jersey, and New Jersey has an interest in the availability of
open courts to its residents.247 New Jersey also had an interest in
the enforcement of a contract between two New Jersey businesses.
Furthermore, the court's holding, that the application of NewJersey
law would frustrate New York's policy of preventing trafficking in
litigation claims, is questionable in light of the fact that the
litigation was in the District of Columbia. 24' Koro, thus, illustrates
the misapplication of interest analysis and its susceptibility to
subjective application.
2. Section 90 and Forum Denials
Even if courts could be expected to apply interest analysis
correctly and objectively, Champerco still cannot rely on interest
analysis to constrain a court to reach results the court prefers not
to reach. The reason is that a court can legally refuse to exercise
jurisdiction over an action that is contrary to a strong public policy
245 Koro, 568 F. Supp. at 287.
246 Indeed the Koro court expressly stated that its own policy against champerty
was a factor in its decision to apply New York's consonant law. See id. In a footnote,
the court even hinted that it might have been willing to apply its own law outright
had the parties raised such an argument. See id. at 287 n.2.
247 Although the original plaintiffassigned its claim, NewJersey has an interest in
the availability of legal redress to injured residents whether through direct
prosecution of their claim or through selling the claim or a portion thereof to
another.
248 Assuming that the policy of preventing speculation in litigation is aimed at
discouraging frivolous claims that are presumed to arise from trafficking in litigation,
only the forum, here the District of Columbia, had an interest in the application of
its law against champerty. However, another policy underlying New York's champerty
statute, as the Koro court recognized in passing, is the prevention of"strife, discord
and harassment" (that is, protecting New York residents from frivolous claims). See
Koro, 568 F. Supp. at 288. If the defendant in Koro, Bristol-Myers, was a New York
corporation or did business in New York, then New York did have an interest in the
application of its champerty statute to protect Bristol-Myers from harassment.
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of the forum.249 Therefore, a forum with a strong public policy
against champerty may very well refuse to entertain an enforcement
action on a champertous agreement.
In American Optical Co. v. Curtiss,2 51 the University of Michigan
assigned its claim against the defendants to American Optical. 51
The dispute involved the ownership of a patent that was developed
by the defendants through their research at the University. 252 The
University claimed that the patent was the property of the
University.253 American Optical was interested in using the patent
and wanted it to be made public to avoid having to pay any
royalties.254 The University of Michigan wanted to vindicate its
rights.255 The University agreed to assign the claim to American
Optical, and American Optical agreed to prosecute the claim and
make the patent public if it succeeded.256 The District Court in
New York held that, even though Michigan law governed the agree-
ment,25 7 the agreement was contrary to New York's public policy
against champerty.258 The court, therefore, refused to entertain
the lawsuit.
259
In Kracht v. Perrin, Gartland & Doyle,261 the plaintiff brought
an action on a legal malpractice claim that was assigned to him by
249 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971) ("No action will
be entertained on a foreign cause of action the enforcement of which is contrary to
the strong public policy of the forum.").
20 56 F.R.D. 26 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
251 See id. at 28.
12 See id. at 27.
25 See id. at 28.
2 See id.
25 See id.
25 see id.
" It is worth noting that the court was of the opinion that, under Michigan law,
the contract may have been void for champerty. See id. at 30 n.6 (referring to 15
MICH. STAT. ANN. § 21.311 (West 1994) and MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 450.681
(West 1990 & Supp. 1995) (prohibiting the practice of law by corporations)).
5 See American Optical, 56 F.R.D. at 29-30.
' The court gave American Optical the opportunity to have the suit reinstated
if it joined or substituted the University as a party-plaintiff. See id. at 32. The
University was later added as a party, but doing so destroyed diversity jurisdiction.
See American Optical Co. v. Curtiss, 59 F.R.D. 644, 646 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). American
Optical released one of the defendants to restore diversity, but the court held that the
released defendant was an indispensable party and dismissed the suit for failure to
join an indispensable party. See id. at 651 ("It seems self-evident that a decree of
cancellation of an agreement will inevitably affect all parties to such an agreement
and, therefore, all parties should be present.").
160 219 Cal. App. 3d 1019 (Ct. App. 1990).
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operation of law.26 ' The defendant argued that California law
applied, under which legal malpractice claims are unassignable.
262
The plaintiff argued that Oregon law applied, under which the
assignment was legal. 263 The California Court of Appeal held that,
even if Oregon law governed the assignment, California courts
would not entertain such a lawsuit, since the assignment of a legal
malpractice claim violated California public policy.
2 4
Section 90 of the Restatement recognizes a forum's interest in
refusing to accommodate lawsuits that are contrary to a strong
public policy of the forum.265 The comment to section 90 states
that the rule has a narrow application: "Actions should rarely be
dismissed because of the rule of this Section." 66 American Optical
and Kracht demonstrate, however, that a forum's public policy
against champerty267 may be sufficient to motivate a court to
refuse to entertain a lawsuit tainted with champerty.
To ensure the enforceability of its champertous agreements, and
thus the viability of investing in litigation, Champerco must ensure
the availability of a favorable forum that will entertain enforcement
actions on its champertous agreements. Champerco must also
ensure that the forum will apply the Restatement's choice-of-law
interest analysis in a favorable manner and/or apply NewJersey law.
G. Forum Selection Clauses
To ensure the availability of a favorable forum, Champerco can
include a New Jersey forum-selection clause in its champertous
agreements. 268 The forum-selection clause should designate New
Jersey as the sole and exclusive forum for any litigation arising
261 See id. at 1021.
262 See id. at 1023-26.
2
0See id. at 1026.
264 See id. at 1027-28.
26See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 90 (1971).
'=6 Id. § 90 cmt. c.
217 Although the public policy in Kracht was the more specific policy against the
assignment of legal malpractice claims, the court cited champerty as one of the bases
underlying the law. See Kracht, 219 Cal. App. 3d at 1023-24 (noting that "assignability
would encourage commercialization of claims" which, in turn, would "promote
champerty").
2 See SEDLER, supra note 148, at 71-72 ("The lawyer can maximize the likelihood
of the express choice of law clause being recognized by including a forum selection
clause .... When the suit is-brought in the state whose law is chosen in the governing
instrument, the likelihood of recognition of the express choice of law clause is
thereby increased.").
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from the champertous agreement. This serves dual purposes.
First, it gives New Jersey courts jurisdiction over any enforce-
ment action by Champerco. New Jersey courts will exercise
jurisdiction on the basis of the forum-selection clause,269 fol-
low the New Jersey choice-of-law clause,270 apply New Jersey law,
and enforce the agreement. Second, the forum-selection clause
prevents the plaintiff from bringing an action to rescind the
champertous agreement in another state that, perhaps, will not
follow the New Jersey choice-of-law clause. 21 Even if the plaintiff
defaults in Champerco's NewJersey enforcement action, the default
judgment will be given full faith and credit in all other states, even
though those states would not entertain the action or enforce the
champertous agreement.
272
H. The Total Solution
The total solution, then, to investing in litigation with-
out running afoul of champerty laws is to execute the champer-
tous agreements in New Jersey, include New Jersey choice-of-law
and forum-selection clauses in the agreement, and bring the
underlying champertous lawsuit in the real plaintiff's name. If
these three steps are taken, investing in litigation is possible and
practicable in any state. Champerty will likely pose no obstacle in
the underlying lawsuit, since the plaintiff's standing will not be
predicated on a champertous agreement, and investors are ensured
of a means of enforcing their agreements against breaching
plaintiffs.
' See National Micrographic Sys. v. Canon U.S.A., 825 F. Supp. 671, 677 (D.N.J.
1993) ("[F]orum selection clauses do not offend the public polic[y] of... New
Jersey."); Wilfred MacDonald, Inc. v. Cushman, Inc., 606 A.2d 407, 409 (N.J. Super.
Ct. 1992) ("Forum selection provisions have long been enforced in NewJersey.").27 See Turner v. Aldens, 433 A.2d 439, 441 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1981) ("It
is well settled that the law of the state chosen by the parties will be honored so long
as that choice does not contravene a fundamental policy of New Jersey."). But see
Winer Motors, Inc. v.Jaguar Rover Triumph, Inc., 506 A.2d 817,821 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1986) (applying Connecticut law to a franchise agreement and refusing to
recognize an express NewJersey choice-of-law clause).
271 See SEDLER, supra note 148, at 71-72 ("[W]here there is a forum selection clause
and the suit is brought in another forum, that court will often recognize the forum
selection clause and decline to exercise jurisdiction.").
272 See U.S. CONsT. art. IV, § 1, cl. 1 ("Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each
State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State.").
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CONCLUSION
A plaintiffs risk-bearing ability effects a plaintiff's decision
whether or not to pursue a claim and the amount for which a
plaintiff is willing to settle. This creates the opportunity for the
trade of claims from poorer risk-bearers, who place a low value on
a claim, to better risk-bearers, who place a higher value on a claim.
Trade of claims to better risk-bearing parties also eliminates two
important strategic bargaining problems,27 - thereby encouraging
settlement and increasing settlement amounts. These theoretical
gains of trade suggest the existence of a market for investing in
litigation.
Investing in litigation, however, violates the letter and spirit of
the law against champerty, whether in force by statute, by common
law, or as a general rule of public policy. Champertous agreements
are, therefore, generally unenforceable in almost every jurisdiction,
except NewJersey. An investor may avoid the dismissal of her claim
by bringing suit in the plaintiff-assignor's name, whose standing is
not predicated upon a champertous agreement. The proceeds of
any judgment or settlement, however, will be paid to the plaintiff-
assignor who is the named-plaintiff. The investor, therefore, is at
risk that after a substantial recovery the plaintiff-assignor will
repudiate her agreement with the investor, and the agreement will
be unenforceable because of champerty,
Investors, nevertheless, can safely invest in litigation with the
security of an enforceable agreement by contracting around
champerty laws. This can be accomplished by providing NewJersey
choice-of-law and forum-selection clauses in a champertous
agreement and by negotiating and executing the agreement in New
Jersey. Champertous agreements are valid and enforceable under
New Jersey law. Where the agreement is executed in New Jersey,
New Jersey courts will enforce a New Jersey choice-of-law clause.
Under choice-of-law principles, the policies underlying all the
relevant states' champerty laws-generally, the policy against
frivolous claims-do not generate a materially greater interest than
New Jersey in the application of those states' champerty laws.
Applying New Jersey law, New Jersey courts will enforce the
investors' agreements. The forum-selection clause will ensure that
New Jersey has jurisdiction to enforce the agreement and that no
273 The two strategic bargaining problems, threat credibility and bilateral
monopolies, are explained in detail in part I.B.
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otherjurisdictions will entertain an action to rescind the agreement.
Investors are therefore ensured of a means of enforcing their
champertous agreements, and litigation investment companies are
legally and practically viable.

